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Abstract 
Policymakers in OECD countries regularly cite reducing political violence as a fundamental 
purpose of foreign aid. For example, countries such as Pakistan and Iraq have received 
considerable amounts of aid meant to address the root causes of political violence. This project 
analyzes quantitative and qualitative evidence to assess whether foreign aid can reduce 
political violence. The quantitative and qualitative analyses study Boko Haram in Nigeria and the 
Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone to focus on regional and country-wide political 
violence. The study further focuses on aid projects in Sierra Leone and Nigeria as a means to 
reduce or curb this violence. This paper finds evidence for aid projects playing a significant role 
in reducing political violence or reconsolidating a country after a conflict. However, this is 
highly contingent on the projects addressing and adequately understanding the needs in these 
countries. 
Note: This honors thesis began as a Ursinus College Summer Fellows project in June/July 2018. 
Sections on the following pages are taken from Rohrer (2018): pgs. 7, 14-16, 22 
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Introduction 
Foreign aid has been an essential tool to combat terrorism and political violence at least 
since World War II (USAID 2017). It has become an integral component of efforts to combat 
terrorism and political violence (Young & Findley 2011). The United States, as well as other 
OECD countries, provide substantial foreign aid to countries with a high number of terrorist 
incidents such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iraq based on the assumption that doing so will 
reduce political violence and advance post-conflict reconciliation. However, there is no 
consensus within the existing scholarship on the effects of foreign aid. Some scholars argue that 
foreign aid decreases political violence while others argue that foreign aid increases political 
violence. This paper weighs in on this debate by studying the impact of foreign aid on political 
violence in the specific cases of Nigeria and Sierra Leone. The study includes both qualitative 
and quantitative analysis. The qualitative study researches the impact of aid projects on terrorism 
and overall human well-being in Nigeria as well as on post-conflict reconciliation after the Sierra 
Leonean civil war. The quantitative study focuses on descriptive statistics and local data in both 
cases.  
Can aid reduce political violence? Existing literature 
Why people engage in political violence: Theories on relative deprivation 
When studying the relationship between aid and political violence, it is key to understand 
why people engage in political violence before investigating whether and how foreign aid may 
mitigate violence. This section, therefore, focuses on leading theories on the motivation and 
grievances of people participating in political violence. Identifying the root causes of political 
violence would help develop targeted policy and development projects to curb these motivations 
and grievances, yet theoretical and empirical studies on the causes of political violence identify 
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different root causes. While there is a common focus on relative deprivation, scholars disagree 
about whether economic deprivation or discrimination along ethnic or religious lines is more 
important. In addition, scholars differ on the question of whether political violence is associated 
with poverty and weak state capacity or if the availability of resources increases incentives and 
opportunities for rebellion. Finally, other scholars argue that any account of political violence 
should examine subnational differences in economic and other grievances. 
The most widely known and influential scholar on the sources of political violence is Ted 
Robert Gurr, whose 1970 book “Why Men Rebel” is considered a landmark work in political 
science and is still highly relevant. According to Gurr (1970, 20-23), to understand political 
violence, the individual has to be understood. Gurr’s argument primarily argues that relative 
deprivation refers to a gap between expectations and what people actually receive. He argues that 
the primary source of violence is the frustration-aggression mechanism. Once the expectation 
and reality of an individual do not match, this individual is more likely to rebel (Gurr 1970, 23-
25).   
Gurr distinguishes between three forms of relative deprivation that can all lead to 
political violence. The first form of relative deprivation is decremental deprivation. In 
decremental deprivation, people become angered and violent as their value expectations stay the 
same, but their value capabilities decrease. In other words, the loss of what they once had or 
thought they had can lead to violence. An example of this kind of deprivation is when 
immigrants take over unskilled jobs, lowering job prospects for native-born unskilled workers 
(Gurr 1970, 46). The second form is aspirational deprivation. In this form of deprivation, the 
value capabilities stay the same while expectations rise. In this case, people feel they have no 
way or means of attaining their new goals, leading them to be angered. Lastly, the third form of 
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relative deprivation is progressive deprivation. In this form, value expectations increase with 
value capabilities at first, until value capabilities decrease and expectations keep increasing. For 
instance, when people get used to long-term, continued improvements in their lives and these 
suddenly come to a halt, people have trouble adjusting their expectations. This can happen after 
an economic depression in a growing economy (Gurr 1970, 52). The relative deprivation 
hypothesis, however, is based on the perception of the individual, which an outsider may not see 
or perceive differently (Gurr 1970, 24).  
According to Gurr, it is essential to understand someone’s grievances to comprehend 
their actions. To recognize these grievances, we must study people’s social and economic status 
and their perception of it (Gurr 2011). In the end, all these factors impact each other. For 
instance, understanding a group’s beliefs and ideologies can shed light on their mobilization 
processes. Once these beliefs and ideologies are understood, the role of government becomes 
essential. According to Gurr, governments that respond to grievances with new policies are often 
not targets of political violence. This is because they can recognize these grievances and respond 
to them before they become a bigger problem. Therefore, the government can be the key to 
causing or solving a conflict.  
In more concrete detail, many factors such as ethnic, economic and political deprivation 
can cause relative deprivation. For instance, economic grievances of particularly marginalized 
groups can increase terrorism and may be stronger in marginalized groups (Piazza 2011, 339). 
Piazza also finds that ethnic disparities, as well as economic disparities, go hand in hand. 
Similarly, Ghatak and Gold (2017) find that minority discrimination may lead members of 
aggrieved groups to join or support terrorist organizations when they are excluded from public 
goods. This is also likely when minority groups are excluded from the political system and 
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denied opportunities to redress their grievances there. In an extensive study of terrorism in 130 
countries between 1981-2005, Choi and Piazza (2014) find that the exclusion of ethnic groups 
from political power is strongly associated with an increase in domestic terrorist attacks (Choi 
and Piazza 2014). The lack of political opportunity as well as unresponsive institutions may 
increase political violence as well (Crenshaw 1981, 384). Government oppression leaves less 
opportunity for citizens to exercise rights and air grievances through channels such as the courts 
or protests (Piazza 2017, 105; Krueger 2007; Crenshaw 1981, 384) which makes political 
violence a last resort (Krueger 2007, Crenshaw 1981, Li 2005, Choi 2010). 
These grievances and motivations for participating in political violence are difficult to 
pinpoint in an individual or group; however, socioeconomic conditions such as lack of education, 
poverty or repression help recognize individual motivation and underlying causes of violence. 
Aid projects can then help curb circumstances that create grievances.  
Why people engage in political violence: Theories on religious and ethnic motivation 
Political violence is also commonly attributed to religious and ethnic motivations or 
flares up around ethnic or religious lines. For example, 64 % of civil wars to date have had a 
component of ethnic or religious conflict. However, most ethnic groups have not experienced a 
civil war (Cunningham and Seymour 2016, 1-8). Conflicts that appear to be ethnic or religious 
often have other underlying factors. For example, the conflict in Ukraine is fought as an ethnic 
conflict while motivations are economical. Political violence can appear around ethnic or 
religious lines, with underlying factors such as grievances. This marks an essential difference in 
the motivation of political violence. A conflict merely motivated by religion or ethnicity are 
complicated to address and alleviating grievances, in this case, would not help. Grievances, 
however, can flare up around one ethnicity or religion as they often experience the same political 
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or economic struggles. It is therefore vital to understand the difference between violence 
motivated by grievances forming around one religion or ethnicity or violence motivated by 
ethnicity or religion. This becomes especially hard to assess as both forms of political violence 
use ethnicity and religion for recruiting. Religion or ethnicity may simplify recruiting for violent 
groups because people of the same ethnic group or religion tend to live close together and share 
the same identity (Cunningham and Seymour 2016, 10-12). Along those lines, religious or ethnic 
cohesion within a group makes it easier to retain members in the group and to ensure allegiance.  
After a civil war, it is also essential to understand how political violence can be 
prohibited in the future. If political violence were only motivated by religion or ethnicity, 
curbing more political violence would be nearly impossible. However, as ethnicity and religion 
only frame the underlying cause, such as grievances, post-conflict reconciliation becomes vital. 
Ensuring equal political and economic opportunity after a civil war, for instance, can make the 
difference between a second civil war and a peaceful country (Cunningham and Seymour 2016, 
15-16). The argument of religion and ethnicity has received much traction in recent years, mainly 
through the media. However, grievances one experiences rather motivated political violence than  
religion and ethnicity itself. 
Why groups engage in political violence: Theories on opportunity costs 
Collier and Hoeffler (2002) argue that rebellions are more commonly associated with 
greed rather than grievance and they point to their empirical finding that the availability of 
certain natural resources (oil, diamonds) increase the likelihood and duration of the conflict. 
Such resources may make the state a lucrative prize for capture, especially in poorer countries 
where low average income decreases the opportunity costs for would-be rebels. Collier and 
Hoeffler argue that grievances are generally not strong enough to trigger conflict so that the 
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opportunity cost of initiating and sustaining conflict becomes decisive. Natural resource wealth 
can be used to reduce opportunity costs and finance rebellions. 
Why groups engage in political violence: Theories on subnational inequality 
Whereas Gurr’s theory of relative deprivation “implies that grievance-induced discontent 
because of the marginalization of certain groups is a major determinant of violent political 
mobilization [but] … inequality is among the grievance factors largely dismissed by recent large-
N country-level studies of civil war (e.g., Collier and Hoeffler 2004 and Fearon and Laitin 
2003),” (Hegre et al. 2009, 602).  Hegre, Østby, and Raleigh call for studies of the neglect of the 
group aspect of inequality. They forward a “horizontal inequality argument” that states that 
inequalities coinciding with regional differences and cultural cleavages may enhance group 
grievances and increase political violence. Hegre, Østby, and Raleigh propose that the poverty or 
deprivation of subnational groups relative to other groups in the population may be more 
important for their support of rebel movements than their absolute poverty: “Support can thus 
derive from an unequal geographical distribution of welfare. The local population is likely to feel 
frustration and antagonism, especially when their deprivation is the result of the government’s 
exploitation and discrimination” (Hegre et al. 2009, 603).  
Theories on the relationship between foreign aid and political violence 
Literature assessing the impact of foreign aid on political violence can be broken down in 
two schools of thought. One school of thought describes aid as a tool used to prop up one side in 
a conflict, thus increasing political violence (Azam 1995 and Grossman 1991/1992). In his 
theoretical argument, Azam (1995) cites proxy civil wars supported by the United States and 
USSR through aid. He argues that these two former superpowers ignited political violence 
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through aid to fight the Cold War on foreign territory (Azam 1995, 174). Azam finds that 
political violence can be mitigated by sharing spoils to opponents of the ruling government as 
well as redistributing funds across regions (Azam 1995, 174). Foreign aid can have an essential 
role in distributing these spoils who can have an impact on decreasing violence. Through these 
spoils, incentives decrease which in turn mitigate the emergence of political violence (Azam 
1995, 174). Grossman (1991/1992) argues that aid can increase political violence as it increases 
possible payoffs. Grossman’s research demonstrates that rebels become dissatisfied with payoffs 
from the government and seek violence to capture the aid, instead of settling for payoffs.  
Meanwhile, Collier and Hoeffler (2002) argue that aid decreases political violence. They 
claim that aid can prevent civil wars through increasing economic growth and military capacity 
as well as reducing the reliance on primary commodity exports. By reallocating funds to 
underfunded sectors in a country, aid can further alleviate political violence.  
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Economic grievances and their role in political violence 
In line with Gurr’s relative deprivation theory discussed above, economic deprivation can 
have a grave impact on political violence and a number of scholarly studies point to poverty, 
poor economic growth and economic discrimination as the leading cause of terrorism and other 
forms of political violence (Piazza 2011, 339; Krueger 2007; Crenshaw 1981, 384). Piazza, for 
instance, finds that economic grievances of particularly marginalized groups can increase 
terrorism (Piazza 2011, 339). In a related argument, Blomberg, Hess, and Weerapana find that 
high-income, democratic countries can experience an increase in terrorism when faced with 
economic contractions, as terrorists find it more promising to engage in terrorism at those times 
(Blomberg, Hess and Weerapana 2004, 463-477).  Hegre et al. (2009) discuss the scholarly 
argument that there is a direct link from economic development to domestic peace. The authors 
find that relatively wealthy areas played a more significant role in the Liberian civil war than 
relatively poor areas. For instance, rebel groups continuously recruited from the same wealthy 
areas in Liberia (Hegre et al. 2009, 619-620). This is interesting as the argument concerning 
economic development and political violence usually links poverty to the recruitment of the 
terrorists and fighters. However, Hegre et al. scholarship show that recruitment can happen from 
wealthy areas just as much. The authors note that their findings tend to support the opportunity 
arguments of scholars like Collier and Hoeffler; however, they also note that the Liberian 
government had minimal capacity at this time.   
Aid, economic growth and economic shocks 
To address economic grievances that lead to forms of political violence such as terrorism, 
economic growth can be a useful tool. Savun and Tirone (2012) argue that aid can dampen the 
effects of economic shocks on the economy and therefore the population. They use Collier and 
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Hoeffler’s (2002) argument that aid can decrease political violence and instability indirectly by 
increasing economic growth and reducing dependence on primary commodity exports (Savun 
and Tirone 2012, 370). Savun and Tirone find that even a little increase in aid can have an 
enormous effect on political and economic stability. They find that foreign aid can help sustain a 
certain level of national spending to maintain institutions while these countries go through times 
of economic hardship (Savun and Tirone 2012, 389). Some scholars highlight additional revenue 
from foreign aid as a valuable tool in rebuilding a country’s economy and to reducing economic 
grievances by increasing economic growth.  Scholars such as Hadjimichael et al. (1995) find that 
foreign aid indeed does have a positive effect on economic growth using a cross-national study 
(Hadjimichael et al. 1995, 610). These studies, therefore, suggest that economic growth can have 
a considerable positive impact reducing political violence. 
Aid, political violence and politics 
Aid and Political grievances 
While economic grievances are a critical factor to keep in mind when studying the impact 
of foreign aid on political violence, political grievances and oppression should be kept in mind as 
well. Political grievances can include the lack of representation of a specific ethnic group, lack of 
political rights such as exercising the right to vote or even a lack of the rule of law. Studies 
focused on the effectiveness of specific foreign aid launched through organizations like USAID 
or World Bank in redressing grievances have found mixed results. For example, an evaluation of 
INVEST, a program that provided Afghan youth with training as well as cash, found that this aid 
reduced the recipients’ willingness to back the Taliban. However, recipients who only received 
training did not have an impact, and those who only received cash proved were more likely to 
back the Taliban (Lyall et al. 2018, 10-15, 18).  USAID reports have shown that some projects 
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aimed at reducing terrorism target the wrong people. An evaluation of the Tunisia Transition 
Initiative showed that the program did not target youth at risk of joining terrorist networks or 
engaging in political violence (USAID 2014). This shows that while foreign aid can address 
economic grievances, political violence may persist due to political grievances. 
Aid and the role of institutions and poverty 
Research on the effectiveness of foreign aid in combatting poverty and reducing political 
violence suggests that foreign aid does not necessarily achieve these goals. On the one hand, 
foreign aid may not be effective in helping the poor. On the other hand, alleviating poverty may 
not address other causes of political violence. Nonetheless, there is a reason to explore the 
impact of foreign aid on terrorism further. As von Hippel notes, a number of extremist groups 
have been able to broaden their appeal by providing the poor with social services such as schools 
and hospitals; lack of government-provided services and international donor support create an 
opening for such groups by leaving marginalized communities vulnerable and susceptible to 
extremist appeals (von Hippel 2010, 53-55). In addition, while terrorist leaders often come from 
the ranks of middle and upper classes, poor education and poverty have convinced (or pressured) 
ordinary foot soldiers to join terrorist organizations (von Hippel 2010, 56-60).  Nevertheless, 
foreign aid and development projects can have a more profound impact in a community beyond 
merely addressing poverty. Foreign aid and development projects can strengthen institutions by 
alleviating problems such as lack of representation or difficulties with the rule of law, or 
community-based projects can be implemented, promoting cooperation across different ethnic 
and socio-economic groups. 
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The role of aid in post-conflict reconciliation 
Donors are not only focused on states currently experiencing political violence but also 
on post-conflict nations. Poor institutions and socio-economic structures are often all a country is 
left with after experiencing conflict or political violence (Mlambo 2009). Aid can become 
significant in post-conflict reconciliation and community building. Most of these programs are 
focused on improving institutions to aid in social reconciliation (Fearon et al. 2009, 287). Fearon 
et al. study the effects these programs have on social interactions and the community and find 
that they can have a substantial impact. Development aid post-conflict can introduce and alter 
patterns of social cooperation even after these programs have concluded (Fearon et al. 2009, 
291). Foreign aid can also become vital in post-conflict reconciliation by aiding in poverty 
reduction. Poverty is another instance of relative deprivation and can lead to economic 
grievances (Chayes 2016). However, these conflicts often leave damaged institutions behind, 
meaning they need to be rebuilt first to reconstruct the state (Mlambo 2009, 58-59). While 
rebuilding the country and during post-conflict reconciliation and reconstruction, it has proven 
effective to focus on rebuilding the state and its institutions, renewing the economy and 
rehabilitating communities (Mlambo 2009, 61).  Foreign aid can play a vital role as long as it is 
tailored to the country’s needs and aims to rebuild pivotal institutions (Mlambo 2009, 65). 
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Negative effects of aid 
Aid increases the duration of political violence 
On the other hand, aid has sometimes been found to worsen political violence and may 
increase the frequency of violent engagements between rebels and the government (Narang 
2015, Strandow et al. 2016, Wood and Molfino 2016). This can happen as foreign aid increases 
uncertainty about the relative strength on both sides of a conflict, which in turn prolongs civil 
wars. In particular, dispersed aid is more likely to cause dispersed, irregular conflict, while 
centralized aid is more likely to contribute to current territorial disputes (Strandow et al. 2016). 
The different types of aid matter as well, as humanitarian aid shows an increase in political 
violence, while other types of aid do not (Wood and Molfino 2016). For instance, food aid does 
not have a negative effect on conflict.  The impact of aid on the duration of political violence is 
also bound to timing (Dippold 2016, viii). Dippold finds that the provision of emergency aid can 
increase localized conflict while non-emergency aid does not. Therefore, a sudden spurt in aid 
may increase political violence.  
Is foreign aid effective in the presence of corruption? 
Some scholars argue that foreign aid may not be as effective as intended, as corruption 
and lack of accountability plagues many receiving countries (Knack 2004, Winters 2010, Eubank 
2011). This is important to consider, as countries that experience political violence may also be 
susceptible to corruption, impacting the effectiveness of aid. Accountability of the government is 
essential to establish institutions supporting foreign aid (Winters 2010, 218). Skeptics of foreign 
aid argue that it reduces governments’ need to rely on their citizens for tax revenues, raising the 
same kind of problem with rentier states that has been applied to oil-rich authoritarian 
governments (Moyo 2009). In turn, this reduces accountability, as citizens lose power they can 
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exercise through taxation (Eubank 2011, 465). Much like the natural resource curse, scholars 
have found a negative connection between foreign aid, democracy, and economic growth. The 
aid curse implies that foreign aid hinders nations from democratizing or improving economic 
growth, the exact opposite effect foreign aid is intended to have. Some scholars such as Djankov 
argue that the aid curse is bigger than the natural resource curse, creating even more obstacles to 
democracy and economic growth than oil (Djankov 2008, 169). Similarly, Knack’s (2000) cross-
country research suggests that higher aid levels reduce the quality of governance and in turn hurt 
growth (Knack 2000, 20). Alesina and Weder (1999) found that more corrupt governments 
receive more foreign aid, while this aid is not able to reduce corruption. 
However, other studies show that foreign aid may lessen corruption assuming that 
countries do not start with high levels of corruption and can provide necessary institutions 
(Okada & Samreth 2012, 240). Tying aid to the implementation of specific rules and imposing 
conditionalities may be able to lessen corruption if these rules and conditions require more 
transparency (Tavares 2002, 104). Thus, regime types and institutions in place can mitigate the 
aid curse (Collier 2007, 103). According to Collier as well as Burnside and Dollar (1997), aid 
has shown to be more effective in nations where governance and policies are already sound 
(Collier 2007, 103; Burnside and Dollar 1997, 4). Harford and Klein (2005) discuss the 
possibility of bringing in the private sector to ensure the full-intended effects of foreign aid in the 
recipient countries (Harford and Klein 2005).  
While the apparent effect of corruption is that foreign aid does not have its intended 
impact on the economy, it can have even more dangerous effects on terrorism and political 
violence overall. Corruption in a country may have adverse effects on terrorism and political 
violence. Corruption may exacerbate poverty and increase income inequalities, fueling economic 
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grievances that can lead to political violence, as discussed above. Therefore, corruption affecting 
aid can implicate and increase violence, although intended to decrease it.   
Summaries of theory-generating literature  
Table 1: Theory generating literature 
Authors Title Year Summary of Main Findings 
Nielsen et al. Foreign aid shocks as a 
cause of violent armed 
conflict 
2011 aid shocks can have negative effects on 
political violence and lead to outbreak of 
armed conflict 
Strange et al. Tracking underreported 
financial flows: China’s 
development finance and 
the aid–conflict nexus 
revisited 
2017 Chinese development aid provides an 
alternative when ‘traditional’ funding is 
withdrawn, therefore conflict decreases. 
This research highlights the importance 
of understanding alternative aid to 
understanding aid and conflict. 
Savun & 
Tirone 
Exogenous shocks, foreign 
aid, and civil war 
2012 foreign aid is essential in sustaining a 
certain level of spending if and while 
countries go through economic hardship 
Narang Assisting uncertainty: how 
humanitarian aid can 
inadvertently prolong civil 
war 
2015 foreign aid increases uncertainty of each 
combatant’s strength prolonging civil war 
Dasgupta et 
al. 
(When) Do antipoverty 
programs reduce violence? 
India's rural employment 
guarantee and Maoist 
conflict 
2017 poverty reduction can address political 
violence when sound institutions are in 
place 
Tahir Does aid cause conflict in 
Pakistan 
2017 mixed results, finding a positive 
relationship between aid on terrorism 




Foreign aid and the 
intensity of violent armed 
conflict 
2016 the increase in foreign aid increases 
political violence. Dispersed foreign aid 
causes dispersed, irregular conflict while 
concentrated aid contributes to 
conventional territorial battles 
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Theory 
Basics of relative deprivation and its forms 
The emergence of political violence and relative deprivation are often tied together (Gurr 
1970, 8).  Relative deprivation happens once the expectation and reality of an individual clash 
and no longer match (Gurr 1970, 15). This deprivation, however, is based on the individual and 
their perception. There are three different forms of relative deprivation, which are decremental 
deprivation, aspirational deprivation, progressive deprivation. The first form of relative 
deprivation is decremental deprivation. In decremental deprivation people become angered and 
violent as their expectations stay the same, but their capabilities decrease. Expectations of an 
individual can range from anything like the belief of achieving something in particular to what 
they believe they are entitled to have. Capabilities, however, reflect the real outcome.  In other 
words, the loss of what they once had or thought they had can lead to violence. This can be seen 
in a society when a status quo can no longer be attained, such as a decline in the capabilities of 
the political elite or economic output (Gurr 1970, 46). The second form is aspirational 
deprivation. In this form of deprivation, the value capabilities stay the same while expectations 
rise. In this case, people feel they have no way or means of attaining their new goals, which 
angers them. This can manifest itself when a new political order or justice is sought after or also 
in the form of greed, wanting to have more material goods (Gurr 1970, 50). Lastly, the third form 
of relative deprivation is progressive deprivation. In this form value expectations increase with 
value capabilities at first, until value capabilities decrease and expectations keep increasing. For 
instance, when a long run continued improvement in people’s life suddenly comes to a halt, 
people have trouble adjusting their increasing expectations. This can happen after an economic 
depression in a growing economy (Gurr 1970, 52). These forms of deprivation are essential to 
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keep in mind as the groundwork for political violence. Aid can be successful in mitigating these 
forms of relative deprivation, both at different phases of violent political contestation.  
Relative deprivation and aid 
Relative deprivation can arise from different instances. It can occur when economic or 
political opportunities decrease, increase and then decrease or when they were never there. Aid 
can mitigate these instances by increasing economic rights and growth and political rights. This, 
violence can be decreased by mitigating relative deprivation (Gurr 1970, 3-12). One argument 
therefore is that foreign aid decreases political violence as it opens up opportunities for economic 
growth, helps countries sustain spending levels during economic hardship and helps alleviate 
oppression and create social programs (Savun and Tirone 2012, Collier and Hoeffler 2002, 
Hadjimichael 1995, Collier 2007, Lyall et al. 2018, von Hippel 2010). 
Nevertheless, aid can have negative effects and therefore increase political violence 
instead. Foreign aid may fail to meet its intended effects due to corruption or prolong civil wars 
as it increases uncertainty (Winters 2010, Knack 2004, Eubank 2011, Narang 2015, Strandow et 
al. 2016).  Therefore, the contrasting and second hypothesis is that foreign aid increases violent 
mobilization.  
Relative deprivation after a conflict 
After a conflict relative deprivation can still be present or be in the process of emerging. 
Poor institutions and socio-economic structures is a major struggle for many countries after a 
conflict (Mlambo 2009). Deprivation can be caused by the lack of or dysfunctional institutions, a 
political process, and a sound economic system. Conflicts also often destroy communities, 
depriving individuals of social interactions and a safe community (Mlambo 2009). Institutions 
most affected often include political authority and a sound economic system as well as necessary 
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infrastructure. Aid programs post-conflict can help rebuild institutions, revive the economic 
system and help integrate communities (Mlambo 2009). After this, these programs can develop 
and create economic growth, political rights but also social stability and the rule of law. These 
factors are all vital in post-conflict reconciliation as these programs can help alleviate 
deprivation and prevent future conflicts. Foreign aid can, in turn, fail to reconstruct a country and 
alleviate future violent engagements when aid project implementation is done incorrectly and 
country specific details are ignored (Grant 2005, Fearon et al. 2009).  
Hypotheses 
The theoretical arguments outlined above lead to the following hypotheses. 
H1: Comparing countries that do and do not receive foreign aid, those that receive more aid see 
less political violence when aid generates economic growth, political rights and a strengthened 
rule of law. 
H2: Comparing countries that do and do not receive foreign aid, those that receive more aid see 
an increase in the prevention of future violent engagement by rebuilding institutions, reviving the 
economic system and re-integrating communities. 
Research Design 
Sierra Leone and Nigeria: The cases 
This research includes a qualitative and quantitative analysis. The quantitative analysis 
examines Sierra Leone and Nigeria as case studies to assess the relationship statistically as well 
as beyond the data and to investigate case evidence. The level of analysis for this is the country 
as well as specific regions. The qualitative analysis of each case examines different aspects of 
aid. The case of Sierra Leone studies aid as a tool for post-conflict reconstruction and 
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reconciliation. The case of Nigeria studies aid as the means to reduce or prevent political 
violence. Both countries suffer from poverty, making foreign aid a central tool to address such 
grievances. Nigeria and Sierra Leone have one of the highest poverty rankings in the world. In 
Nigeria, about half of the population lives in poverty (Adebayo 2018). In Sierra Leone, sixty 
percent live below the poverty line (Kaldor and Vincent 2006).  Both states have suffered from 
political violence and grave death tolls as a result of it. Researchers estimate the death toll of 
political violence in Sierra Leone between 1989 and 2013 to exceed 20,000 people as of 2013 
(Sundberg and Melander 2013). Another, more recent source estimates the death toll to be 
around 50,000 (Thomas 2018). Similarly, researchers estimate the death toll of political violence 
in Nigeria between 1989 and 2013 to exceed 50,000 people. More recent estimates suggest the 
death toll be around 60,000 people for the time period of 2011 to 2019 (Campbell 2019). 
However, Sierra Leone and Nigeria are distinct in two aspects. While Nigeria is currently 
struggling with terrorism, Sierra Leone is moving towards a more stable future. Sierra Leone is 
becoming freer, at least statistically speaking. In 2001 Freedom House score was partly free with 
individual scores of 4.5 out of 7, seven being the worst, in freedom rating, 5 in civil liberties and 
4 in political rights (Freedom House 2001). In 2018 these scores had improved with 3 out of 7, in 
freedom rating, civil liberties and political rights (Freedom House 2018). 
Additionally, GDP per capita in Sierra Leone has increased since 2001. In 2001 the GDP 
per capita in Sierra Leone was 230.09$, and in 2017 it was 499.42$ (World Bank FRED 
Database 2018). For the purpose of this study, I study the onset of political violence in Nigeria 
and post-conflict reconciliation in Sierra Leone. Nigeria has suffered from political violence in 
the forms of terrorism. Starting in 2009 the terrorist organization Boko Haram began to use 
violent tactics (Felter 2018). 2009 marked the first significant incident by Boko Haram with an 
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armed uprising as the result of police crackdowns (Felter 2018). Boko Haram is not only 
responsible for kidnappings and terrorist attacks but also insurgency and controlling territory 
(Felter 2018).  
Meanwhile, Sierra Leone has suffered from political violence in the past, with no recent 
events after 2002/2003 (Sundberg and Melander 2013). The main perpetrator of political 
violence in Sierra Leone was the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). The RUF was not only 
responsible for starting the Sierra Leonean civil war but also for the illegal trade of conflict 
diamonds, used to finance the civil war as well as using child soldiers during the war (Brummel 
2006). Studying post-conflict relations in Sierra Leone may be crucial to study the effect aid has 
on post-conflict reconciliation. In addition, natural resources such as the diamond trade in Sierra 
Leone may contribute heavily to economic growth. 
Quantitative Analysis  
While the hypotheses only point towards a country-wide study the quantitative analysis 
examines variation within countries. The quantitative analysis focuses more specifically on a 
regional analysis and national analysis. The regional analysis focuses on local differences 
between foreign aid and political violence in certain regions. This is mostly achieved through a 
description of spatial patterns in aid and violence. 
Meanwhile, the national analysis focuses on the overall question of the impact of foreign 
aid on violence and is analyzed using descriptive statistics. Both analyses study Nigeria and 
Sierra Leone starting in 1990 and continuing to 2014. This period is able to incorporate the full 
period of the Sierra Leonean civil war, which ranged from 1991 to 2002, as well as Boko Haram 
activity which was founded in the 1990s.  
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Data & Methodology 
To examine the relationship between foreign aid and political violence, the quantitative 
analysis uses several databases combined into one dataset. To put together a quantitative analysis 
that I could study, I needed data that measured foreign aid and political violence, on the national 
and regional level. To operationalize foreign aid, I chose to utilize the dataset AidData.  I chose 
AidData, as it records all amounts of multilateral and bilateral aid including but not limited to 
non-governmental organizations or multilateral organizations (Tierney et al. 2011). AidData 
includes aid flow as reported from the donor perspective and is the most comprehensive database 
on foreign aid and development finance (Tierney et al. 2011). 
Further, I chose AidData as it included comprehensive and detailed spatial information 
about aid projects and transactions both on the regional as well as national level. The unit of 
measurement for AidData is the amount of aid given to a country in a given year in U.S. dollars, 
and the data ranges from 1947 to 2013.  The variable of projects was chosen as it directly relates 
to the qualitative analysis, focusing on individual projects. Projects are also able to give us a 
different idea on resources put into the country, apart from monetary. However, the variable 
transactions were still incorporated to understand the amount of money flowing into one country 
and its impact. For the purpose of this research, three different AidData datasets are used. One, 
the core research release which details aid from one organization or country to another country. 
The other two datasets specifically record the amount of aid in the provinces and states of Sierra 
Leone and Nigeria. In order to understand the impact of aid on the local level, these different 
datasets are used.  
In order to test the amount of political violence, this research uses both the UCDP and 
ACLED databases. The ACLED database includes battles, violence against civilians, remote 
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violence, protests, riots as well as non-violent events. The unit of measurement of the database is 
the single event, and the database ranges from 1997 to 2018. The ACLED is the most 
comprehensive database on political violence, which is why it was chosen. For the purpose of 
this study, these datasets include the UCDP dataset, which also analyzes the single event of 
political violence (Croicu and Sundberg 2017). The UCDP includes political violence events 
starting in 1975 and is, therefore, able to encompass the temporal parameters further. The dataset 
breaks down events of political violence as non-state violence, one-sided violence as well as 
state-based violence.  In order to operationalize the study, the number of events was studied as a 
variable. I chose this variable as it can tell us more about the terrorist's motivation of how often 
they choose to strike and when. 
Variables 
Concept Studied Variable Variable Type Database 
Political Violence Violent Events 
(count) 
dependent ACLED, UCDP 
Foreign Aid Aid given to a 
country in a year 
(in million U.S $), 
projects in a year 
independent AidData 
Table 2: Variables in quantitative study 
Dependent Variable 
The primary dependent variable of interest is domestic political violence. For the purpose 
of this paper, political violence is defined as the use of force for political reasons by non-state 
actors. The ACLED definition of political violence informs this definition: “(…) the use of force 
by a group with a political purpose or motivation. ACLED defines political violence through its 
constituent events, the intent of which is to produce a comprehensive overview of all forms of 
political disorder, expressed through violence and demonstrations, within and across states. A 
politically violent event is a single altercation where often force is used by one or more groups 
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toward a political end” (ACLED 2017). This definition is taken from the ACLED codebook to 
have a cohesive definition throughout the project, matching with the events coded in the ACLED 
database. The ACLED definition is also coherent with the definition of the UCDP, the other 
database used to study political violence. 
Further, the ACLED codebook also mentions non-violent instances included in the 
dataset “to capture the potential pre-cursors or critical junctures of a violent conflict” (ACLED 
2017).  However, these non-violent instances are not included in this research as they do not fit 
the definition of “the use of force (…)”. This decision was made as the research aims to identify 
the initial relationship between aid and the event of political violence and how this relationship 
can help alleviate political violence and post-conflict reconciliation. The definition for this 
research does not include state violence. I chose to omit state violence, as the goal of this 
research paper is to understand the effects individual aid projects and aid can have on a country 
and its people and therefore also its terror organizations. State violence does not fall under this as 
they often do not experience the same amount of grievances as the general population. The 
purpose of this research is to study the effect of aid on the initial emergence of political violence 
as well as post-conflict resolution. State violence is often perpetuated in response to this initial 
emergence of non-state violence instead of the initial factor. The effect aid can have on ending 
conflict is greater than it can have on ending state violence. 
For the purpose of this research, defining the instance of an event is essential as it is used 
as the unit of measurement in both the UCDP as well as ACLED databases. The UCDP database 
defines an event as “an incident where armed force was used by an organized actor against 
another organized actor, or against civilians, resulting in at least one direct death at a specific 
location and a specific date” (Croicu and Sundberg 2017).  
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Independent Variable 
In order to assess the role of foreign aid and other variables in explaining increased or 
decreased political violence, I use the amount of money that countries receive in developmental 
assistance as my primary independent variable. To measure this, I use indicators from AidData, 
the most comprehensive as well as an updated source of data on foreign aid, with commitment 
information for over 1.5 million developmental finance activities between the years 1947 and 
2016 (Tierney et al. 2011). This dataset includes data from 96 donors and includes official 
developmental assistance (ODA), other official flows (OOF), equity investments as well as 
export credits. ODA, as used by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 
includes all aid undertaken by official sectors that are intended for economic development and 
given under concessional financial terms. The OECD defines ODA as “Official development 
assistance (ODA) is defined as government aid designed to promote the economic development 
and welfare of developing countries. Loans and credits for military purposes are excluded from 
ODA. Aid may be provided bilaterally, from donor to recipient, or channeled through a 
multilateral development agency such as the United Nations or the World Bank. The aid includes 
grants, "soft" loans (where the grant element is at least 25% of the total) and the provision of 
technical assistance." (OECD 2018). OOF refers to official flows to developing countries that do 
not meet the criteria of ODA since they are not necessarily designed to promote economic 
development or given under concessional financial terms. Equity investments refer to money 
invested in a firm by stockholders with no return in normal business course and export credits 
offer a financing arrangement provided to foreign buyers to assist in the purchase of goods and 
services from national exporters.  
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This study uses descriptive univariate statistics instead of correlations between aid and 
violence. Descriptive statistics are used in this case to further explore the extent of aid, projects, 
and violent events as well as to understand the average of such in a year further. While 
regression analysis is used to study the relationship between two variables, using this analysis 
does not lend itself to this study. However, the regression analysis would raise some problems. 
While regression analysis can study short term and long-term effects, this would go beyond the 
scope of this paper. Therefore, using regression without accounting for short-term and long-term 
effects would leave this project with limitations in terms of temporal parameters, leaving the 
study unable to define the temporal impact of aid on violence. This would leave the study with 
problems of which events to include or which to omit, as they are connected to the year, they 
occurred in.  In addition, a regression would be unable to account for regional research such as 
looking at spillover of aid into different states or regions. All these questions and problems could 
be answered with different statistical tools, however for the purpose of and the scope of this 
research I decided to describe basic patterns of the relationship and then explore the possible 
impact of some projects in the qualitative analysis.  
Qualitative Analysis 
In addition to the quantitative analysis, this research also encompasses a qualitative 
analysis. Sierra Leone suffered from the civil war from 1991-2002, while Nigeria suffers from 
the violent activities of Boko Haram currently. The qualitative analysis includes temporal 
parameters from 1990 to 2018. The temporal parameters in the qualitative analysis encompass 
more years as the availability of quantitative data does not constrain the analysis. A comparative 
analysis and regional analysis are used to study the cases of Sierra Leone and Nigeria. The 
variant (or variable studied) in this analysis is the amount of foreign aid and its impact on 
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political violence and post-conflict resolutions. The qualitative analysis aims to analyze 
grievances levels pre, during and post-conflict. These levels can be poverty levels, GDP per 
capita or ethnic grievances. The emergence of the RUF in Sierra Leone and the eventual end of 
the conflict is studied with regards to the impact of aid in both the beginning and end of the 
conflict.  
Background on Case Studies 
Motivation of Boko Haram Members  
The biggest pool of recruits for Boko Haram consist of young boys that either attend 
Islamic school or no school at all. Nigeria has the highest number of non-enrolled school 
children with 70 % of the population illiterate and one in three schoolchildren not going to 
school. This is especially grave in Northern states (Comolli 2015, 70). Many almajirai, or boys 
that have attended Islamic school end up as recruits for Boko Haram. This is mostly due to the 
lack of opportunity both for employment and higher education, as the education in these school 
solely focuses on memorizing the Qur’an. 
Further, this materializes and progresses when these youths find themselves in 
complicated financial situations (Comolli 2015, 73). Interviews with young Boko Haram recruits 
show that they are all at least partly motivated by financial compensation or for financial reasons 
(Comolli 2015, 78). A United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report shows that stark 
levels of unemployment, as well as economic need, often play a significant role in the 
recruitment of new members. While economic factors are not the tipping point for recruits, it 
certainly aids terrorist organizations in recruiting (UNDP 2017, 55). Boko Haram is also active 
in neighboring countries such as Chad, Cameroon, Niger, and even Mali. State officials of 
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Nigeria state that most Boko Haram members today are foreign nationals (Comolli 2015, 84-
105). 
Boko Haram Funding 
In the beginnings of Boko Haram, most funding came from agriculture, small trading 
activities as well as local small businesses set up with microloans by Yusuf (Comolli 2015, 78). 
Further, funding comes from members who are expected to pay a membership fee of 100 Naira 
(0.8$) per year, from donations including from politicians as well as ties to other terrorist 
organizations and money from robberies, ransom money, and protection money. Boko Haram is 
also involved with Al-Qaeda, which helps fund Boko Haram and provides technical support 
(Comolli 2015, 80). Many Boko Haram members are also part of the local government and 
collect taxes for Boko Haram. However, this has stopped with the 2013 state of emergency 
(Comolli 2015, 80-82).  
A military response to Boko Haram by the Nigerian government 
Nigeria has started to deploy the military with the help of the police as early as 2003 and 
has since been in frequent contact with Boko Haram. Nigeria has the best equipped and best-
funded military in West Africa with 80,000 troops, and the emergence of Boko Haram increased 
the Nigerian defense budget (Comolli 2015, 109-110). Further struggles in the North of Nigeria, 
especially Borno led to the emergence of the JTF ORO, Joint Task Force Operation Restore 
Order in 2011. The task force’s activity led to Boko Haram’s relocation to Yobe state. As a 
result, the government deployed the JTF ORO also to Yobe, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba, and 
Adamawa. However, the JTF ORO had several problems, including difficulty to obtain 
intelligence due to the refusal of locals to cooperate and the extensive borders (Comolli 2015, 
110-115).  
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Then in 2011, the first state of emergency was declared. This affected Borno, Yobe, 
Niger and Plateau states. More importantly, though, this also granted emergency powers 
including the ability to detain a suspect, taking control of any property in the emergency area as 
well as entry and search of any promises to the Nigerian military (Comolli 2015, 115-117). In 
response, Boko Haram gave Christians in the North a three days’ notice to leave the area and 
announced that Boko Haram would be ready to fight the government. Boko Haram then 
launched attacks in several states, against Christians and Muslims almost daily and President 
Goodluck Jonathan received much criticism as a result from both Muslims and Christians alike. 
In 2012 the state of emergency was lifted; however, Boko Haram’s violence did not stop. Boko 
Haram continued to cause violence by destroying several dozen cell towers, killing foreign 
workers including health workers. 
As a response, in November 2012 the government put an N50 million bounty on Shekau 
and lesser sums on individuals believed to be with Shekau (Comolli 2015, 120). Negotiations 
between the government and Boko Haram then started with the government offering amnesty for 
fighters willing to renounce violence. Meanwhile Boko Haram was negotiating for the freedom 
of all detained members. Further attempts to negotiate with Boko Haram led to the murder of the 
point in contact, Babakura Fuggu, the brother in law of Yusuf (Comolli 2015, 123). In 2013 
another state of emergency was declared, and the largest military deployment since the Nigerian 
Civil War was recorded. Additional curfews, entry and search and detention powers were 
granted to the military. This removal of constitutional rights arguably made matters worse, 
decreasing trust in the government, military, and police (Comolli 2015, 125). The JTF was then 
again deployed into the North of Nigeria, setting up a communication blackout and rounding up 
Boko Haram members as well as innocents, many were killed. 
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Nevertheless, Boko Haram continued to attack, now especially schools. However, locals 
were said to fear the JTF more than Boko Haram. Fed up with this many young men started 
“Civilian JTFs,” to identify and point out real Boko Haram members to the JTF (Comolli 2015, 
125-127). Boko Haram responded to this by declaring war on the civilian JTFs and killing many.  
In late 2013, the the Army 7th Infantry Division replaced the JTF. This was partly due to 
the JTF being controversial and only somewhat successful. This was also because Boko Haram 
evolved as an organization, using women and children as spies and smuggling explosives and 
IED’s. The state of emergency was then extended until 2014 (Comolli 2015, 128). In 2014, the 
most known associated event with Boko Haram happened. Boko Haram kidnapped school girls 
in Chibok, Borno. This happened for several reasons, including financial gain through human 
trafficking, to upstage the Nigerian government's authority, to provide brides for fights and as 
Comolli argues for bargaining power and as retaliation to the JTF arresting and detaining many 
children and wives of Boko Haram members. In response, the Nigerian government released 
some of these wives, including one of Shekau’s wives. This also prompted a massive 
international response with military support from the UK, USA, Canada, France, China and 
Israel (Comolli 2015, 130).  
Human Rights Abuses in Nigeria 
Human rights abuses in Nigeria have especially increased with the military response to 
Boko Haram. The Nigerian military engaged in many extrajudicial killings during raids in 
Nigeria, primarily due to a lack of trust in the rule of law (Comolli 2015, 131). Military raids 
with the goal to hunt down Boko Haram have also destroyed buildings, homes and killed 
innocent civilians. The JTF ORO has been especially controversial as they often engaged in 
harassment and rape during raids as well as taking bribes during vehicle checks (Comolli 2015, 
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135). Amnesty International has reported that over 950 people have died in military custody in 
2013 (Comolli 2015, 136). 
A non-military approach 
While the Nigerian government has heavily responded to Boko Haram with the military, 
some softer approaches have been taken as well. Some non-military approaches have included 
community programs and strengthening the rule of law. The Nigerian National Security Advisor 
office has plans to counter the radicalization of the youth in Nigeria through community 
programs and to work with the local government as well as NGOs. In order to flush out 
extremism in church and education, a register of “good” imams and radical one has been created 
(Comolli 2015, 136). The Nigerian NSA established a program and goals focused on education 
and preventing radicalization before it emerges but also in prison, as well as alleviating poverty 
all with the help of NGO’s, the UN, and civil organizations. These projects were implemented in 
2013 and 2014, with plans such as creating new curriculums for schools. However, this often 
faces challenges such as the lack of schools, to begin with and targeting the wrong group of teens 
(Comolli 2015, 135-141). These challenges are associated with a lack of funds as well as 
implementation.  
 (Forced) Recruitment of RUF fighters 
Recruitment of RUF fighters involved the RUF breaking into homes, tying up parents and 
shooting them in front of their sons. The sons are then captured and forced into fighting for the 
RUF. Ex-RUF fighters testified at a trial against Sankoh that they were forced and coerced into 
fighting for the RUF using violence and fear. Eventually, many of the RUF fighters developed 
familial ties to Sankoh, most likely due to losing their own families at the hands of the RUF as 
well as their young age (Gberie 2005, 62-63). Girls and boys of captured towns were also forced 
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to help and fight for the RUF. However, others joined the RUF willingly, fed up with the Momoh 
regime.  
After the war 
After the war the British forces withdrew most of their troops, leaving behind a military 
training team. UNAMISL also dismantled most of their troops, completely withdrawing from 
Sierra Leone in 2005 ((Gberie 2005, 105). The successor of UNAMISL was the United Nations 
Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOISL). The Sierra Leonean civil war left behind mass 
atrocities. Over 50,000 people died as a result of the war (Gberie 2005, 6). After the war, Kabbah 
was re-elected President for another five-year term. The political party of the RUF, RUFP, had 
little support and did not have a single seat in parliament (Carter Center 2003). The atrocities 
committed at the hands of the RUF during the war was long and grave. The RUF was responsible 
for several massacres of civilians, the drafting of underage soldiers, mass rapes and mutilations 
were committed (Gberie 2005, 125; Oosterveld 2013, 235). The forcible recruitment of children 
in the war led to many children brainwashed and drugged resulting in withdrawal symptoms and 
left with no families. 
Additionally, over two million people were displaced, and villages were destroyed 
(Kuiter 2001). In 2003, the Special Court of Sierra Leone issued indictments of war crimes to 
several key figures in the civil war including Sankoh, Hinga Norman, and Charles Taylor. 
Sankoh then died in prison in July 2003 (Farah 2003). 
Sierra Leone today  
While human security has improved in Sierra Leone, the state is still weak with damaged 
institutions and a general distrust of politics (Kaldor and Vincent 2006). Civil society and 
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communities are also weakened, with high unemployment and former child soldiers needing a 
new place in society (Kaldor and Vincent 2006). The collapse of the legal system, corruption, 
poor service delivery of essential goods like water and lack of transparency are all characterisitcs 
of the weak state of Sierra Leone. The general state of the infrastructure is poor, and the Sierra 
Leonean military has been decreased to 13,000 troops (Robertshawe 2010). High levels of 
poverty and deprivation, as well as a weak judiciary, also contribute to high levels of crime. 
Another factor of human rights violations is female genital mutilation, which has grown to be a 
prominent practice in Sierra Leone (Kaldor and Vincent 2006). Little funds for public resources 
such as education has also weakened civil society Especially women have been marginalized in 
Sierra Leone both during and after the war. Another marginalized group in Sierra Leone are the 
youth, including former child soldiers. Many emerged from the war without any job prospects 
with 58% of young people being unemployed. Poor schooling and forced displacement into cities 
contributed to this. However, life is not much better in rural areas, where domestic violence is 
high, and around 80%-90% of girls undergo female genital mutilation (FGM). Young men are 
often forced into modern-day slavery as they are required to work, for several years, for the 
family of a girl they may want to marry (Kaldor and Vincent 2006). 
Moreover, the economy has suffered throughout and after the war. Sierra Leone’s GDP 
decreased by more than half during the war, partly due to the immense destruction of 
infrastructures such as markets, stores, rice fields, and mining fields. While economic growth has 
increased after the war, the country is highly indebted and dependent on foreign aid. Sierra 
Leone is one of the poorest countries in the world with 82% of the population living on less than 
$2 a day.  








N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Variance 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic Statistic 
Projects 292 1.00 46.00 4.83 .35 6.04 36.51 
Transactions 289 431.00 903 million 611 million 77 million 1 billion 1.7 trillion 
Events (GED) 271 1.00 288.00 7.89 1.43 23.61 557.67 
Events 
(ACLED) 




      
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for violent events and aid for Nigeria, sources: GED, ACLED, AidData 
Table 3 shows that the average of GED and ACLED events are around 8. This comes 
with a standard deviation of 23 and 18 events, showing how many events, on average, are higher 
or lower than the average amount of events.  The mean for aid tells us the average amount of aid, 
being 611million U.S dollars. The mean for projects tells us that the average amount of projects 
is 4.8.  
Violent Events 
In Figure 1: Violent events per year in Nigeria, source: GED database it becomes clear that violent 
events as recorded by the GED database increased around 2010 and continuously increased up to 
2015. This indicates the emergence of Boko Haram around 2008/2009 (Felter 2018). 
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  Furthermore, the difference in a number of events pre and post-2010 is stark. This is 
interesting considering that Boko Haram was active before. However, the numbers reflect 
important events as well as a change in leadership well. While Boko Haram emerged at the 
University of Maiduguri in 1995, the sect did not become fully radicalized until Mohammed 
Yusuf took over in 2002 (Comolli 2015, 47). From late 2004 to 2008 Boko Haram stayed mostly 
dormant re-emerging after a violent clash with the security forces, JTF ORO (Comolli 2015, 51-
52). After the capture and extra-judicial kill of Yusuf in 2009, a new leader emerged in 2010. 
Abubakar Shekau, the second in command to Yusuf took over. Shekau is known to be even more 
radical than Yusuf and altered the movement to be even more violent. This coincides with the 
enormous surge of violent events in 2010. With the new leadership also came new splinter 
groups to Boko Haram as well as recruits from neighboring countries, increasing the violence. 
The increase in violence, especially around 2009 and 2010 and the continuous increase can be 
explained by the change of leadership in Boko Haram, making the organization more radical. 
  
Figure 1: Violent events per year in Nigeria, source: 
GED database 
Figure 2:  Violent events per state in Nigeria in from 1990-
2014 using satellite view, source: GED 
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  Figure 2 further shows the number of violent events in Nigeria per state in total. This 
includes all violent events in Nigeria from 1990 to 2014. The graphs show clusters of many 
events specifically in the North and Northeast of Nigeria. These states are Borno in the very 
north, Yobe state to the left of Borno, Adamawa state underneath Borno and Plateau state. Borno 
is perhaps the most important state when studying Boko Haram. Boko Haram emerged out of 
Maiduguri, a city in Borno. They then recruited young men from the local university as well as 
almajirai. Almajirai is boys that have received a formal Islamic education. Due to this education 
and the lack of professional education, many almajirai fail to find employment (Comolli 2015, 
70-72). Yusuf promised financial stability and a purpose in life. Yobe state then became the 
second base of operations when military and the JTF ORO flooded Borno with officials starting 
in 2009. Why events in Adamawa are high is not particularly clear but may be due to its 
proximity to Borno state as well as the border to Chad and Cameroon. This border later became 
significant as more and more fighters were recruited from neighboring countries and splinter 
groups formed of Boko Haram, involved in conflicts such as the civil war in Mali (Comolli 2015, 
115-130). Violent events are particularly high in states such as Borno, as Boko Haram originated 
out of this state and as it sees a significant number of grievances. 
 
 





Additionally, Error! Reference source not found. shows that data from the GED dataset 
also coincides with information according to the ACLED database. However, the data seems to 
show more events than graph 1. This can be due to the methodology used in the ACLED dataset 
and GED dataset. This methodology can mean that the ACLED database classifies more events 
as political violence. 
 
Error! Reference source not found. and Error! Reference source not found. show 
that violent events are also high in other states, other than Borno. Here, events are still high in 
Borno state and Bauchi, however also in states located in the Niger Delta such as Delta, Edo, and 
Bayelsa. These events in the Niger Delta can most likely be attributed to the large oil reserves in 
the area. These oil reserves have been subject to many conflicts including civil unrest. Starting 
2003 militants started to form in the Niger Delta, attempting to fight the exploitation of 
multinational corporations such as Shell (Pigrau 2013). The data suggest that most events are 
caused by two groups, Boko Haram and Niger Delta militants. 
Figure 3: Violent events and year in Nigeria, Source: 
ACLED 
Figure 4:  ACLED events per state in Nigeria in total with 
satellite view, source: ACLED 





In this graph (Error! Reference source not found.), it is evident that transactions 
increased explicitly 
around 2009 when 
Boko Haram’s activity 
increased and became 
more violent. It is 
interesting to note that 
this was also the year 
the Nigerian 
government began 
heavily cracking down 
on Boko Haram, 
detaining many of its members as well as detaining and killing Yusuf (Comolli 2015, 109). 
However, after 2010 transactions plummeted, while Boko Haram gained even more traction 
throughout the years with events such as the Chibok schoolgirls kidnapping in 2014 (Holpuch 
2018). It is unclear why transactions plummeted, but maybe due to reasons such as aid dedicated 
to entirely different areas in the first place or a changing objective of donor countries. For 
instance, many aid organizations such as the Gates foundation provide aid for global health 
Figure 5: Aid transactions and year in Nigeria, Source: AidData 
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problems such as AIDS. AIDS in Nigeria has decreased by 21%. Therefore, programs targeting 
AIDS prevention would likely decrease the amount of aid given (UNAIDS n.d) 
Figure 6 shows the breakdown of transactions per state in Nigeria. It becomes clear that 
aid is concentrated at the other side of the country, primarily in states such as Sokoto on the 
border to Niger, and the cluster of Katsina, Kano, and Kaduna. While Borno state receives 
considerable amounts of aid, surrounding states such as Bauchi, Yobe, Gombe and Adamawa 
receive little in comparison. This is shocking as Boko Haram activity concentrates in all of these 
states with bases in Yobe. However, many nations also give aid for different objectives other 
than fighting Boko Haram in Nigeria, concentrating on different areas. For example, Briggs 
(2017) found that aid does not flow to the poorest regions in a country (Briggs 2017, 187). The 
concentrated aid in the North West of Nigeria could be due to poverty levels there (McAdams 
2014). Sokoto state has been ranked as the poorest state in Nigeria with a poverty rate of 89.9% 
(Egbas 2018). Poverty levels in the North East are high as well. States such as Jigawa and Yobe 
have high poverty levels as well, however, receive less aid. States such as Kano, on the other 
hand, have also been a victim to considerable high-profile attacks by Boko Haram. This includes 
explosions killing over 200 people (Comolli 2015, 133). Aid is concentrated in states where 
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Boko Haram does not necessarily operate which may be due to other objectives of donor 
countries. 
 
Figure 6: Transactions per state in Nigeria in total, source: AidData 
  
Figure 7: Projects and year, Source: AidData Figure 8: Projects per state in Nigeria in total with satellite 
view, Source: AidData 
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Figure 7 and Error! Reference source not found. show that many areas of Nigeria 
receive help through projects. Projects are categorized as development projects financed through 
foreign aid; these projects are aimed at improving certain area or institutions of the country. 
Notably, Borno has a high number of projects as do Cross River, Kaduna, Kano, and Niger. 
Projects in Borno are consistent with an argument that aid targets conflict-heavy areas. Cross 
River on the other hand is a popular tourist destination as it includes many waterfalls, national 
parks and festivals (Cross River State Government 2019). Kaduna and Kono on the other hand 
house many corporations such as textile manufacturers (Maiwada and Renne 2013). 
Further, Niger is a state in the Niger Delta, the most important oil-producing region in 
Africa, where militant groups have formed in protest of the oil industry (Pigrau 2013). Projects 
have fluctuated throughout time with most projects beginning in 2010. From then on projects 
decreased which could be due to safety concerns. Several aid workers have been targeted and 
killed by Boko Haram and countries such as the United States de-branding the name USAID 
from their programs in Nigeria (Comolli 2015, 148).  
Summary 
The quantitative analysis on Nigeria shows that events have increased particularly 
starting in 2009 corresponding 
with the emergence of Boko Haram in 2009. Transactions and projects also increased around 
2009, consistent with this emergence and spur of violence in 2009. However, aid projects and 
transactions decreased throughout the years, while violent events and the presence of Boko 
Haram in Nigeria has increased.  This is somewhat inconsistent with the hypotheses that aid 
decreased violence. However, this observation also highlights two problems in this study. For 
one, this research does not encompass reasons why countries give aid and for what specific area. 
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The aid given may have been given to target a completely different area of the country, having 
no effect on violence. Secondly, it is also difficult to conclude whether or not aid reduces 
violence or if violence simply sparks more countries to give aid. This shows that aid may not be 
able to decrease violence by itself or that aid is motivated by something other than violence. 
Sierra Leone 
This section explores the data showing the distribution of violent events and aid in Sierra Leone.  
Descriptive Statistics 
 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Variance 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic Statistic 
Projects 59 1.00 86.00 30.94 2.85 21.90 479.63 
Transactions 58 4 million 2 billion 463 million 61 million 467 million 218 
quadrillion 
Events (GED) 35 1.00 186.00 41.45 6.64 39.32 1546.72 
Events 
(ACLED) 
57 .00 370.00 37.84 10.56 79.78 6365.17 
        
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for Sierra Leone, Source: ACLED, GED, AidData 
Table 4 shows 35 observations of violent events (state-year) in the GED dataset and 57 
observations in the ACLED database. The minimum amount of events recorded in the GED is 1 
with a maximum of 186. Meanwhile, the ACLED has a minimum amount of 0 with a maximum 
of 370 events. The mean tells us that on average around 40 events were recorded per year. With 
41 in the GED dataset and 37 in the ACLED dataset.  
 




Figure 9: Events and year in Sierra Leone, Source: 
GED 
Figure 10: Events and year, Source: ACLED 
 
 Figure 9 and Figure 11 show the increase of violent events starting in 1990 with a spike 
in 1998, ending around 2000. There is a specific spike of events in 1998 and decrease of events 
in 1996, 1999 2000 and 2001. The spike of events in 1998 coincides with the intervention of 
ECOMOG and President Kabbah taking back the presidency after the previous coup, removing 
him from power (Gberie 2005, 111). The intervention of the ECOMOG forces sparked much 
violence at. First, however ECOMOG was able to take over major cities and areas. In 1999 
events decreased drastically, most likely due to the Lomé peace deal. The Lomé peace deal was 
able to reach consensus between the Sierra Leonean government and the RUF, allowing DDR 
programs to take into effect. This disarmed many rebels and allowed them to receive food, 
shelter, and training in return (Gberie 2005, 163). From then on violent events decreased through 
2002, when the civil war officially ended.  
 
Figure 11 and Figure 12 show that violent events have increased throughout 1998 and then 
decreased after the Lomé peace deal was signed in 1999.  
 





Figure 13: Transactions and year, Source: AidData Figure 14: Transactions and province in Sierra 
Leone, Source: AidData 
 
 
Figure 13, Figure 14, Error! Reference source not found. and Figure 16 show that aid was 
given as a form of post-conflict reconciliation to rebuild the country.  Figure 11 shows that aid 
increased after the civil war was over. Around 2003 just right after the civil war ended aid 
  
Figure 11: Violent events and province in Sierra 
Leone, Source: GED 
Figure 12: Events and province in Sierra Leone, 
Source: ACLED 
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increased in Sierra Leone with a spike in 2003 and 2010, suggesting aid given as a form of post-
conflict reconciliation.  Similarly, Figure 11 shows that projects increased as well especially after 
the end of the civil war and an additional spike from 2007 to 2012. 
Summary 
This quantitative analysis on Sierra Leone shows that violence in Sierra Leone increased 
during the civil war, especially coinciding with the intervention of ECOMOG forces and 
fluctuating presidencies and coups. Violence decreased dramatically after the signing of the 
Lomé peace deal and then further after the end of the war in 2002. After 2002 and with the end 
of the war came an increase in aid projects and transactions, presumably to reintegrate former 
soldiers and rebuild the nation. This is consistent with the hypotheses, stating that aid has an 
impact on post-conflict reconciliation. This is further instrumental in rebuilding the country and 
reintegrating former soldiers. 
Summary of Quantitative Analysis 
The quantitative analysis’s primary focus was to test the relationship of foreign aid on 
political violence in a quantitative matter. The quantitative analysis studied the cases of Sierra 
  
Figure 15: Projects and year: AidData Figure 16: Projects and Province in Sierra Leone, 
Source: AidData 
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Leone and Nigeria. The analysis focused on Sierra Leone, and Nigeria shows how violent events, 
transactions, and projects coincide. In the case of Sierra Leone, there is an increase in violent 
events at the same time as the intervention of ECOMOG forces in the civil war and President 
Kabbah taking back the presidency after the previous coup (Gberie 2005, 111). Then 1999, 
around the time of the Lomé peace deal, events decreased drastically. The Lomé peace deal was 
able to reach consensus between the Sierra Leonean government and the RUF, allowing DDR 
programs to take into effect. After the Lomé peace deal was signed into effect, violent events 
decreased through 2002, when the civil war officially ended. After the 2002 mark, transactions 
and projects increased showing that aid was given as a form of post-conflict reconciliation to 
rebuild the country. The increase of aid after the war and violent events after military 
interventions match with expectations for this project. This also shows that it is worthwhile 
studying post-conflict reconciliation as countries give more aid after the conflict is over. 
For the study of Nigeria, the emergence of violent events coincides with the emergence 
of Boko Haram and its violent spurs throughout the years. The analysis also shows clusters of 
many events specifically in the North and Northeast of Nigeria. This also matches with the 
emergence of Boko Haram in the North, specifically Borno. Transactions increased explicitly 
around 2009 when Boko Haram’s activity increased and became more violent. However, 
transactions then fluctuated throughout the years, although Boko Haram increased their violent 
events with events such as the Chibok schoolgirls kidnapping in 2014. This is interesting to see 
as the expected outcome would be seeing aid increase as events increase. This also highlights the 
difficulty of the project and assessing aid. This project does not address why countries give aid, 
as this is not in the scope of this thesis and would require more research. For instance, the aid 
given to Nigeria could have been given for reasons other than reducing terrorism. It is also 
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important to note that both cases benefit from foreign aid as it funnels more resources into the 
nation, allowing the combatting of grievances. 
Qualitative Analysis 
A humanitarian approach to Boko Haram by aid organizations 
While the Nigerian government primarily focused on deploying their Nigerian military 
within states to combat Boko Haram, foreign aid and development programs focused on a more 
humanitarian approach. As both poverty and education contribute heavily to the circumstances 
surrounding the recruitment of Boko Haram, this section focuses on aid projects focused on 
improving education and decreasing poverty.  The section then evaluates how much these 
projects were able to address these grievances commonly associated with political violence. 
Education in Nigeria 
Education in Nigeria begins with basic education which parents expect to be free and 
starts at six years old. Basic education then consists of six years of primary education and three 
years of junior education teaching children literacy, math, the three main languages of Nigeria 
and English. The junior education level then increases the number of courses taken to ten to 
thirteen and regularly tests the students on their knowledge. Successful completion of their 
exams rewards them with a certificate to go on to the senior schooling levels. The senior 
education level is designed to prepare the students for university. After successful completion of 
three years of senior education and passing the senior level exams, a student may choose to go 
onto university (International Organization for Migration 2014). 
While enrollment in schools in Nigeria rose through the 1970s, the 1990s and post-1990s 
saw a decline in enrollment. Today around 61% of Nigerian students receive primary education. 
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However, this number changes according to regional disparities with numbers much lower in the 
North of Nigeria. In 2010, Northern Nigeria experienced the lowest enrollment rate of 19% while 
Southern Nigeria’s highest education rate was 91% (International Organization for Migration 
2014). The presence of militants and political violence also influences education, especially in 
the North, with many schools being forced to close (World Bank 2015). Female education 
enrollment is also much lower compared to male education enrollment in the North, while 
female education enrollment in the South is higher than male education enrollment in the South. 
Education enrollment sees an even more drastic change when it comes to junior, senior and 
college enrollment. The gross enrollment ratio (GER) for secondary education is estimated to be 
around 31% with 7.2 million young people not enrolled in school. This ratio falls even more with 
the transition from junior to senior levels, with a transition rate of 16% (International 
Organization for Migration 2014). For those that do attend schools learning outcomes are poor. 
Many students enrolled and graduating from primary school are unable to read which is due to 
poor skillset of teachers and the lack of resources (World Bank 2015) 
Once a student completes the senior education level with plans to attend university, they 
may face additional capacity challenges. Currently, Nigeria has 153 universities with only 
around half a million slots open for students each year. In 2013, 1.7 million candidates registered 
for the university entrance exams, even though slots were limited. While the number of 
universities keeps increasing, the capacity and quality does not (International Organization for 
Migration 2014) 
A needs assessment of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and funded by 
the European Union shows gaps in the Nigerian education system. These gaps start with skill 
level gaps between Nigerian students and global standards, in science, math, foreign languages 
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and technology in the basic and post-basic education system. But it also shows that often 
teachers lack pedagogical, technology and counseling skills. Lack of infrastructure, teaching 
materials, and research equipment is a crucial factor and a factor in the mass exodus out of 
Nigeria in search of better education (International Organization for Migration 2014). This mass 
exodus of people in search of a better education also hurts the Nigerian economy as skilled labor 
and the educated leave the job market, leaving behind unskilled labor or those with limited 
education. 
Hypothetical Claim 
To make an impact on terrorism and recruitment and for H1 to hold to be true, we should 
see that aid projects such as the project on Global Partnership for Education have improved 
factors such as net school enrollment, literacy rates as well as gender gaps in education. 
Aid Project in Nigeria on Education 
A significant global program to improve education all around the world is the Global 
Partnership for Education. The Global Partnership for Education is a program that includes 
several countries aimed to improve education in developing countries working with grants 
through civil society organizations and coordinating agencies, often the World Bank. Nigeria is a 
part of the Global Partnership for Education and the last grant the Nigerian government has 
received is aimed at “promoting school effectiveness and improved learning outcomes”, 
“increasing access to basic education for out of school girls” and strengthening planning and 
management systems including learning assessments and capacity development” and has a 
budget of 100million US dollars (World Bank 2015). The project focuses particularly on 
Northern states, which also have the highest numbers of out of school children. This is due to 
many children attending religious schools or poverty. Others begin education much later than at 
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six years old or drop out of school after receiving their primary education, around age eleven 
(World Bank 2015).  
The grant by the NIPEP supports the Nigerian government in improving human capital in a 
bid to strengthen its economy. The grant identified five Northern states with especially poor 
education; those states are Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina and Sokoto (World Bank 2015). The 
goal of improving education is measured with the following indicators: 
• Primary Net Enrollment Rate 
• Gender Parity Index (primary enrollment) 
• Hausa reading rate of students enrolled in the Primary 2 and three grades 
•  English reading rate of Primary 3 pupils  
• Number of Direct Project beneficiaries (disaggregated by gender)  
• Establishment of a System for Learning Assessment at the primary level 
• The utility of the Learning Assessment System 
The project stresses the importance of working together with the Nigerian government as well as 
the states and to set realistic goals for the project. The project has three components with the 
following goals: 
Goal Indicators/ Specific Action 
Promoting School Effectiveness and 
Improved Learning Outcomes 
 
Grants for students and material, established 
classrooms, support for the cost of training of 
teachers, improving enrollment and 
encouraging students to stay in school 
Increasing Access to Basic Education for Out-
Of-School Girls 
Expand basic education to girls through 
scholarships for students and female teachers, 
supporting staff, teachers, and facilities 
crucial in helping girls learn 
Strengthening Planning and Management 
Systems including Learning Assessment and 
Capacity Development 
Improving management, monitoring and 
capacity building through audits, reviews and 
progress reports as well as school visits 
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Table 5: Grant Goals for Education Project in Nigeria, Source: World Bank 2015 
However, the project also has an estimated risk factor of high due to a relatively short 
time horizon to implement the policies, the decentralized flow of funds and coordination 
difficulties across five states and security risks (World Bank 2015). The report also points to 
corruption as a possible challenge in the project, which the grant aims to curb through improving 
education management on the local level. The project and funds are also regularly audited to 
prevent corruption and to increase accountability. 
Project Success 
Direct Success 
Several factors including percentage enrollment, gender parity index, Hausa and English 
reading rates for primary students every year measure the success of the project While the 
percentage of students enrolled in school decreases during the time the project has been running, 
the gender parity index increases and the reading levels in English and Hausa stay the same, as 
seen in table 2 (World Bank 2018). 
 Baseline (2015) Actual (2017) Current (2018) Goal (for 2019) 
Primary school 
net enrollment 
48 % 46.40% 46.40% 52% 
Gender parity 
index 
72% 83% 83% 76% 
Hausa reading 
rates 
4% 4% 4% 10% 
English reading 
rates 
3% 3% 3% 10% 
Table 6: Goal assessment of education project in Nigeria, source: World Bank 2018 
Aid project impact on terrorism  
While this project is a good start in making education more attainable and increasing the 
number of students enrolled in school, it misses the important part of non-integrated Qur’anic 
schools. As Menashy finds in her study, GPE projects often fail to address the issue of private 
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schooling such as Qur’anic schools (Menashy 2017, 250). Many students that are not enrolled in 
regular education are enrolled in Qur’anic schools, and most members of Boko Haram are 
comprised of graduates of Qur’anic schools. Integrating Qur’anic schools is essential to 
improving the education level in Nigeria as many Qur’anic schools do not teach math, science or 
languages. Some programs to look for in this matter is a project by UNICEF in Nigeria.  
UNICEF projects implemented in Nigeria focus on the integration of Qur’anic schools 
with the regular education system and improving the education system overall. UNICEF in 
Nigeria focuses particularly on girls’ education as well as capacity building and focusing on 
children not enrolled in school. The program aims to work with the Nigerian government as well 
as unilateral aid-organizations such as USAID. UNICEF particularly plans to increase teacher 
competencies and gender inclusive pedagogy, which will be done through capacity building for 
primary teachers and qur’anic facilities (UN ECOSOC 2017). The program also supports 
strengthening the community and their understanding of education as well as increasing 
enrollment through enrollment drives. UNICEF in Nigeria has also been able to inspire local 
imams and Qur’anic leaders to integrate their schools with the Nigerian education system 
(Akingbulu 2018).  
Possible Shortcomings 
The project failed the expectations set to satisfy H1. H1 states that countries that receive 
more aid see less political violence when aid generates economic growth, political rights and a 
strengthened rule of law. However, this does not necessarily mean that the project has done no 
good. In table 2 it becomes evident that the project has increased the percentage of schools 
benefiting from grants and further training. This project is one of many, and it may take several 
projects over time to sufficiently improve the factors set as determining factors in the 
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hypothetical claim section. The project report also fails to incorporate a critical view of the 
project fully and does not address limitations. However, a large part of this may be because the 
project is still going on and is not scheduled to be finished until 2019.  
A better idea of the success of the Global Partnership for Education (GPE) may be gained 
through scholarly reports on the program. Menashy (2017) studies the overall success of the 
Global Partnership for Education project with special attention to private schooling. Overall, 
GPE projects fail to address private schooling in receiving countries (Menashy 2017, 240). 
Menashy argues that this is mostly due to the multistakeholder nature of the GPE, representing 
many political bodies that choose to “strategically avoid” the topic of private education. This is 
largely due to the possibility of institutional clashing, causing political entities in 
multistakeholder organizations to avoid the subject. This further applies to other policies that 
may cause clashing or disagreement, with private education highlighting the issue (Menashy 
2017, 261). This is an important factor to keep in mind which may render the projects by the 
GPE less successful, in terms of achieving their goals.  
Summary 
 The project was mostly unsuccessful in achieving its pre-set goals such as improving 
access to education. This, however, does not mean that aid is necessarily unsuccessful in 
addressing grievances but highly conditional on understanding and addressing local conditions. 
Understanding and addressing these local conditions is important for the success of the project 
but also to cut down recruitment for a terror organization. For instance, the project did not focus 
enough on Qur’anic schools, a breeding ground for Boko Haram recruits. Additionally, this 
project faces criticism of the general structure of GPE projects due to its multistakeholder nature.  
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Poverty in Nigeria 
As evident in the section on education, poverty is growing in Nigeria and impacting other 
sectors such as education. During the 1990s economic growth stagnated, however, this improved 
through the 200s with an increase of 5% in GDP (World Bank 2014). The economy in Nigeria is, 
however, still not growing enough to support the large population. Poverty was especially bad 
after the Nigerian military rule ended, characterized as a rural phenomenon with rates of up to 
70% in some rural areas. While the poverty rate decreased for a short period in 2004, the total 
population living in poverty did not decreased due to population growth. The poverty rate then 
increased again in 2010 to rates of 70% (World Bank 2014). This poverty rate has devastating 
consequences for another sector of life, decreasing the number of children being able to go to 
school, decreasing the amount of the population with safe access to water and increasing child 
mortality rates.  
The poverty rates in Nigeria are high, although there are a general increase and 
improvement of the Nigerian economy. Today, the Nigerian economy is considered the largest 
economy in Africa is mostly benefiting from the petroleum industry (Ajayi 2019). The Nigerian 
economy benefited from an increase in oil prices in the 1970s, massively increasing the 
economy. This also improved infrastructure, government services, construction and 
manufacturing jobs which led to many people moving to more urban areas. The sudden 
migration from rural to more urban centers, reduced the agricultural sector massively causing the 
need to import primary commodities (Ajayi 2019).  Beginning with the 21st century, Nigeria 
continued to face unsteady growth which led the government to lend from international sources 
and introducing austerity measures. To repay their massive debt, much of the national budget 
was designated to repay loans. A 2005 debt-relief plan by the Paris Club forgave Nigeria most of 
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its debt. However, the high fluctuation of oil prices led Nigeria to a recession in 2016, from 
which the country is still recovering from today (Adebayo 2018). 
Poverty is still a devastating factor in the lives of many Nigerians today. As of 2018, 
Nigeria has the largest number of people living in poverty followed by India. Eighty-seven 
million Nigerians live in poverty today, on average living on less than $2 a day (Adebayo 2018). 
This number is further increasing with an average of six people falling into extreme poverty 
every minute. While Nigeria has launched programs such as the structural adjustment program 
pre-1999, this also failed in improving poverty (World Bank 2014). A recent report by Oxfam 
and Development Finance International ranked the commitment to reducing poverty from the 
Nigerian government at the bottom of 157 countries (Kazeem 2018). 
Hypothetical Claim 
To make an impact on terrorism and recruitment and for H1 to hold to be true, the World 
Bank project on alleviating poverty should see an increase in access to basic infrastructure in 
select states. 
Aid Project in Nigeria on Poverty 
The fail in the structural adjustment program in the 1990s led the government to rethink their 
approach to poverty in Nigeria, which fostered a partnership with the World Bank. The World 
Bank along with the Nigerian government and the African Development Bank then developed 
the CPRP project with the following project objectives: 
• To improve access of the poor to social and economic infrastructure 
• To increase the availability and management of development resources at the community 
level 
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The project focuses on the states with the highest poverty levels, as selected by the Nigerian 
government; Abia, Cross River, Ekiti, Kebbi, Kogi and Yobe (World Bank 2014). In another 
phase of the program the states Edo, Gombe, Osun, Zamfara, Ebonyi and Kwara were added. 
The project marked the first large poverty reduction project targeted at fostering community-
based projects. The project was also the first poverty reduction project partly carried out by the 
government, focusing on the community aspect at all. The project cost around 103million U.S 
dollars with the following goals: 
Goal Indicators/Specific Action 
Capacity building Support institutions in poverty monitoring, 
monitor impact of state-led programs, provide 
resources  
Community-based initiatives in basic social 
and economic infrastructure 
Independent state-level social fund to fund 
community initiatives, education and 
information on the local level, supervising 
and funding micro-projects 
Table 7: Project Goals, Source: World Bank 2014 
The project has a complex framework with several parties involved, including ministries 
at the federal level, the respective state governments, and community level governments and 
committees. The framework of the project can is summarized in Figure 17. 
 61  
 
 
Figure 17: World Bank Project on Poverty Reduction in Nigeria framework, source: World Bank 2014 
The project was largely carried out by the Nigerian National Planning Commission 
(NPC), which is the Nigerian agency responsible for poverty reduction. However, this was 
switched to the Federal Ministry of Finance as the NPC lacked the capacity for the project. 
Project Success 
Direct Success 
The success of the project is evaluated by measuring the outcomes of the two objectives, 
improving access of the poor to social and economic infrastructure and increasing the availability 
and management of development resources at the community level. Access of the poor to social 
and economic infrastructure has been improved, with 2999 micro projects. These micro-projects 
were mostly focused on education, water supply, health, roads and bridges (World Bank 2014). 
The projects were also sustainable, with 92% of projects still being operated after one year and 
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around 90% of projects after four years. Figure 2 shows the number of projects per state and 
sector.  
Figure 18: Amount of projects per state and sector, source: World Bank 2014 
3085 communities benefited from the project, accounting for 10.3 million residents. In addition, 
school enrollment in primary states grew by around 60% in states where the project was being 
carried out. The second outcome measured, increasing the availability and management of 
development resources at the community level is rated modest with over 300 communities 
participated in micro-projects. Over 300 organizations also received skill-based training in 
managing funds. While agencies and arrangements were put in place, cooperation between the 
government and community does not appear strengthened.  
Aid project impact on political violence and recruitment 
The project did meet the goals set to satisfy H1. The project was able to improve basic 
infrastructure to reduce poverty. Reducing poverty and creating social stability is instrumental in 
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stabilizing the country and groups that are at risk of being recruited. Poverty is a factor that can 
constitute relative deprivation and therefore increase frustration among the population. A United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report shows that stark levels of unemployment, as 
well as economic need, often play a significant role in the recruitment of members in terror cells. 
While economic factors are not the tipping point for recruits, it certainly aids terrorist 
organizations in recruiting (UNDP 2017, 55).  
Poverty is a big factor in recruiting within terror cells due to psychological and economic 
factors. A psychological factor is the decreasing positive outlook on life and opportunity. Lack of 
opportunity is also the main economic reason, having no job and little money to provide for 
public services. The lack of opportunity becomes an easy target for terror cells that can provide a 
sense of belonging, public services and status. For instance, Boko Haram was able to provide 
monetary incentives to their members and splinter groups of Boko Haram are currently providing 
public services. Especially the provision of public services by the splinter group ISWAP garners 
much support, as these services are provided to non-Members as well (Obaji 2019). The project 
is still important, however, as it increases institutional access to education and the provision of 
public services. Therefore, the program is a good start in reducing the recruitment of members. 
However the state needs to be strengthened as well to increase public resources. 
Possible Shortcomings 
The project has improved access to basic infrastructure immensely as seen in figure 2. 
However, the success of the project may be limited as the results framework had not been fully 
developed at the time of the project. Several components of the projects, especially funding 
community projects had no designated organization to provide these resources. Another limiting 
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factor in community projects was the lack of trust between the Nigerian government and 
individual communities (World Bank 2014). 
Further, the monitoring and evaluation process of the project was not spelled out directly, 
causing shortcomings. Baseline results were also not included in the project as the M & E 
process was poorly spelled out, making the evaluation of goals attained much more difficult. 
Several important factors that needed to be recorded for successful evaluation were not recorded 
including but not limited to the involvement and attendance of community members in the 
project, poverty data at the beginning of the project and number of organizations involved 
(World Bank 2014). 
While the World Bank addresses some of their shortcomings in their report, detailing 
improvements, other factors can have an impact as well. Nigeria has suffered from extreme 
poverty in the North, yet the states chosen to be a part of the project were not the ones with the 
highest poverty levels. This means states with especially low poverty did not benefit from the 
project. Of course, this is not much of a shortcoming as other states benefited from the program; 
however targeting the correct states is crucial in reducing circumstances that influence the 
recruitment of Boko Haram members.  
Summary 
The project was generally successful in implementing social programs and curbing 
recruitment. The project was able to improve access of the poor to social and economic 
infrastructure with 2999 micro projects. These micro-projects were mostly focused on education, 
water supply, health, roads and bridges (World Bank 2014).  However, the project ran into some 
problems as it was not fully developed and frameworks to assess the success of the project was 
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not fully developed before the project began to take off. In addition, while the project is a good 
start to curb the recruitment of Boko Haram, more needs to be done to strengthen the 
government of Nigeria.  
Reconstructing Sierra Leone through aid projects 
Some improvements have been made in Sierra Leone through the past years, and aid 
projects still play a pivotal role. Some improvements were achieved through local councils. In 
addition, a new National Election Commission Local and provisional security has been 
established throughout the country, and the United Nations, as well as British troops, were 
integral in helping the country post-conflict. The situation of the youth has also seen an 
emergence of self-organized organizations. One example is the Bike Riders Association, a group 
of former child soldiers that mostly stole motorcycles during the war. Today they earn their 
money by providing transportation to people. The group has a membership base with an identity 
card and maintenance support, much like a tax organization. However, none of these 
organizations include girls, who have been hurt the most and have the least amount of power 
(Kaldor and Vincent 2006). 
As institutions and the rule of law are often damaged by political violence, post-conflict 
efforts have to focus on reconstructing institutions and reintegrating the community. Sound 
institutions such as the rule of law can often aid in reintegrating the community and fostering a 
new trust between the community. Aid organizations and projects can help foster this new trust 
and help rebuild institutions, as long as projects are tailored to the country’s needs (Mlambo 
2009). In the case of Sierra Leone aid projects focused on topics such as education, the rule of 
law to further overall disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR). The aid projects I 
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focus on in this section focuses on one DDR project focused on ex-combatants and the other on 
education in Sierra Leone. 
DDR in Sierra Leone 
Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration projects are vital to stopping a country 
from slipping back into a civil war. Broken institutions, as well as the shadow state and economy 
of Sierra Leone, can further foster this situation. The idea of DDR programs is to part fighters 
from their weapons and militias and then help them into civilian life through education, money 
and training. Since the 1908’s there have been over sixty DDR programs, many focusing on 
Sierra Leone and its civil war (The Economist 2018). DDR projects started with the Lomé peace 
deal. The Lomé peace deal negotiations were the first negotiations that gave civil society a voice 
in peace deal negotiations, unlike in the previous three peace deal negotiations.  However, the 
civil society’s demand for justice was met with little enthusiasm from the government and the 
RUF. Eventually, the peace deal included a ceasefire, the emergence of a DDR project and the 
inclusion of the RUF in the Sierra Leonean government as well as amnesty for all fighters 
(except crimes against humanity) and their reintegration into the community. The DDR process 
in Sierra Leone consisted of three stages. The first stage started under the Kabbah regime in 1998 
with the support of the UNDP, ECOMOG and the World Bank. This stage was designed to 
provide an out for fighters, especially in already defeated regions (Sesay and Suma 2009). This 
also saw the emergence of the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reintegration (NCDRR) to further coordinate the reintegration of fighters.  
Phase two then included RUF representatives, but otherwise still had the same mandate. 
This time the NCDDR and UNAMSIL chaired more important parts of the committee. Phase 
three then began after fighting continued throughout 2000, after the signing of the Lomé peace 
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deal. The Abuja accords, a ceasefire agreement between the Sierra Leonean government and the 
RUF, called for further disarmament of all fighters involved in the war. This stage was the final 
stage as it saw no further outbursts of violence, allowing more collection centers to be set up. 
The DDR process also allowed ex-fighters to be reintegrated into their community by offering 
training, education and monetary incentive (Sesay and Suma 2009). However, the DDR process 
left little space for women and children. The biggest challenge was that the DDR process was 
only designed for ex-combatants, meaning women and children that were used as cooks, maids 
or medics were left out. Women that were combatants, however, often did not receive any 
incentive either as they feared further abuse in collection and training centers. The official DDR 
program of Sierra Leone ended in 2003.  
Hypothetical claim 
If H2 holds to be true, we should see an increase in ex-combatants receiving training and 
being reintegrated in the community and an increase in women participating in these programs 
through the project on DDR. 
Aid Project in Sierra Leone on DDR 
DDR has been the focus of many multilateral and unilateral aid projects. One of these 
projects is carried out by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (GIZ). The projects overall goal was to foster DDR in Sierra Leone, specifically 
reintroducing ex-combatants into civilian life and establishing a peaceful community. Other 
goals included poverty reduction, securing the internal peace process and creating a more 
inclusive space for women. The program was employed in partnership with the NCDDR and 
Ministry of Development and Economic Planning (MODOP), starting in 2000 until 2005 with a 
total contribution of around six million Euros (Trentmann 2010). The project focused on 
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vocational training as a means to reintegrate ex-combatants as well as peace building and skills 
training. The project also emphasizes capacity building through the community, local and 
national level. The project aimed to re-integrate ex-combatants and through this improve the 
following four markers: 
• Poverty reduction through vocational training allowing ex-combatants to reduce their 
chances of slipping into poverty 
• Gender equality by giving men and women the same opportunities in attaining training 
• Crisis prevention integrated into the training 
• Environmental factors such as agricultural training 
The project also identified markers to evaluate the project success after initial training and the 
start of the project. The markers are designed to identify the impact the project will have in the 
long-term (Trentmann 2010). These markers are: 
• 75% of ex-combatants remain in the settled villages 
• 50% of people trained in income generating activities are still active 
• The population in targeted communities qualifies as non-violent 
Project Success 
Direct Success 
The project had considerable success in their four individual markers and the overall goal 
to reintegrate ex-combatants in the community. In particular, different social groups were able to 
be reintegrated into society; this was especially successful in the local regions of Kailahun, Port 
Loko, and Pujehun. However, the project covered more than just these three districts. In total, the 
project focused on thirteen different states (Trentmann 2010). The project was able to 
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successfully integrate several social groups into their programs and took community needs and 
preferences into account. The project was also able to address goals set in poverty reduction, 
gender equality, and crisis prevention. However, sustainability in terms of environmental factors 
could see improvement. The project success can, therefore, be summarized in the following 
table. 
Project Goal Success of Goal 
Poverty reduction The training was able to provide a better 
socioeconomic status to all groups (men, 
women, and children) 
Gender Equality Women and men had equal access to training 
facilities; caring centers provided an 
opportunity for mothers to care for their 
children 
Crisis prevention Civil and human rights, as well as crisis 
management, were taught as part of the 
training 
Environmental factors/ sustainability Agricultural training taught the importance of 
sustainability, but no measurements were 
taken to improve this 
Table 8: Project goals, Source: Trentmann 2010 (GIZ) 
Overall the project was able to train 2354 persons [1258 noncombatants (521 women); 874 ex-
combatants (99 women) and 222 ex-child soldiers]. Additionally, some of the long-term goals 
were met by the project, as detailed below. 
Long-term Goal Success of Goal 
75% of ex-combatants remain in the settled 
villages 
80-88% of trained ex-combatants remained in 
the settled villages and are considered 
integrated 
50% of people trained in income generating 
activities are still active 
60% of trained ex-combatants report their 
source of income as business activities 
The population in targeted communities 
qualifies as non-violent 
No quantitative markers have been set or 
reported for this goal, but self-reports of ex-
combatants point towards reduced violence 
due to training and general acceptance in the 
community 
Table 9: Outcomes of Project, Source: Trentmann 2010 (GIZ) 
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Aid project impact on post-conflict reconciliation 
The project meets all the goals set as markers for the hypothesis to hold true, however, 
could have done more to incorporate former female soldiers and women trapped in the war. The 
project was able to reintegrate many former soldiers into communities, training them and 
providing them with work. This is crucial in post-conflict reconciliation as grievances, and 
possible relative deprivation should be addressed to curb future political violence. This project is 
a good start in terms of DDR, giving ex-combatants an opportunity to receive training and 
reintegration into society.  
While the project does include women in their DDR process, they do not receive special 
attention or consideration in this project. Women in Sierra Leone often do not receive training 
such as the one in the DDR project. Women in Sierra Leone participated in the civil war in the 
forms of wives, maids, cooks or medics. However, many DDR programs require weapons to be 
turned in, in return for training (Sesay and Suma 2009). As a result of that, women are often left 
out of the DDR effort. Even women that did participate in the war as combatants did not receive 
any training either as they feared further abuse in collection and training centers. Women in 
Sierra Leone are at the periphery of society, struggling with domestic violence and suffering 
from FGM. Violence against women was a horrible side effect during the civil war and did not 
stop after the war was over. While some laws are designed to give women an out in abusive 
relationships, most of these laws are never enforced. Other laws allow men to have immense 
control over women, especially in a marriage. For instance, a widow can be forced to marry her 
deceased husbands’ brother or risk losing her home, land, and children (Larson 2013). A woman 
that wishes to report a case of domestic abuse has to undergo immense cost for medical 
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procedures and filing a police report, while her case may result in no charges filed and her return 
to the relationship. 
Possible Shortcomings 
While the project was generally successful, the post-project evaluation also finds some 
possible shortcomings in the implementation of the project. The overall effectiveness of the 
project was rated as good; however, some issues arose working multilaterally. Through the 
project, one of the key partners in the project the NCDDR in Sierra Leone ceased to exist. This 
made reconciling data especially difficult, as no institutions were present anymore (Trentmann 
2010). This also further complicated the evaluation process.  
The project also failed to include any monitoring process to assess issues at the beginning 
of the project. Further, the project had a high financial need for personnel, training and technical 
staff which is justified by the post-war situation and the need for DDR projects. The project also 
did not put much emphasis on agriculture and farming and provided only little training in this. 
The evaluation report recognizes that and suggests further building on training in farming so ex-
combatants can support their livelihood. Lastly, the project recognizes the importance of women 
in the DDR process; however, fails to address their role in the civil war (Trentmann 2010). 
Summary 
This aid project has been able to make considerable strides in terms of reintegrating and 
training former soldiers to rebuild communities and the country. Specifically, the DDR project 
was able to lead former soldiers into employment or establishing their own business. This project 
is also important to post-conflict reconciliation and curbing future political violence by 
decreasing the possibility of grievances. Reintegrating and training former soldiers decreases the 
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opportunity for this group to become marginalized and experience grievances. While the project 
did a good job overall, it could have done more to include women and former female soldiers. 
The program retrained 2354 persons, of which only around 500 were women. Women continue 
to hold a difficult place in Sierra Leonean society, with little rights and lack of enforcement 
mechanisms for attained rights.  
Education in Sierra Leone 
Education in Sierra Leone faces many challenges partly due to the destruction of 
institutions from the civil war. The Ebola virus outbreak in the country made providing 
education even more difficult by decreasing the economy and national spending on education. In 
2015 the economy had decreased by 21% as a result of the Ebola outbreak. Domestic revenue 
declined by 10% of the GDP and inflation increased to 9.8% by the end of 2014 and further 
17.4% by 2016. This has caused a decrease in overall national spending, impacting the education 
sector. In 2013, the percentage of public expenditure spent on education was 2.4% of the GDP 
and the amount per student around $106-150, the lowest in the West African region (World Bank 
2017). 
On the individual level, participation rates have decreased after the Ebola outbreak. 
Socioeconomic and regional disparities continue to influence the quality of education in Sierra 
Leone. The quality of education is further impacted by limited access to primary and secondary 
education. While this has improved, the number of schools in Sierra Leone is still considerably 
low, and many schools are private, keeping enrollment rates low (World Bank 2017). For 
students that are in school, learning outcomes and retention rates are poor. 87% of first graders in 
Sierra Leone are unable to read a single word and poor writing and speaking skills. Many 
students also drop out of school, for instance around 52% of students dropped out of the first 
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grade in 2012. Students are also plagued by gender disparities, with women being more likely to 
drop out of school than men. Teacher qualifications also decrease the quality of education in 
Sierra Leone. Teachers are often not trained or trained but lack the knowledge and pedagogical 
skillset to mentor students (World Bank 2017). Lack of infrastructure is another issue in 
education in Sierra Leone. The lack of the number of schools in Sierra Leone leads to 
overcrowding and excessive student-teacher ratios. Around 50% of schools have a student-
teacher ratio of 40:1 and classrooms are poorly equipped, lack textbooks and need repairs.  
Nevertheless, the Sierra Leonean government has improved in terms of education, 
moving from a recovery to a development phase. In 2007, Sierra Leone joined the Global 
Partnership for Education starting several aid projects. The government mostly works with other 
aid organizations to implement an education project. These projects mostly focus on girl’s 
education, the quality of education as well as capacity building (World Bank 2017). 
Hypothetical claim 
To make an impact on post-conflict reconciliation and for H2 to hold to be true, the 
project should rebuild the institution of education through an increase in education quality, a 
number of teachers receiving training and girls receiving an education.  
Aid Project in Sierra Leone on Education 
The aid project of interest is a project by the World Bank to increase access to education, 
enrollment rates, and learning outcomes. The project is built on recent issues with the Ebola 
outbreak and the cut of national spending. The project, Revitalizing Education Development in 
Sierra Leone (REDiSL), was developed by the Sierra Leonean government with the help of 
several other developmental agencies such as the World Bank as part of the Global Partnership 
of Education. REDiSL was founded in 2014 to support already existing framework, with a 
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budget of 22million U.S dollars. The already existing framework, the Education Sector Plan 
(ESP) was built on three pillars: 
• Access, equity, and completion 
• Quality and learning outcomes 
• Systems strengthening 
REDiSL was created to support these pillars with the following global objectives further: 
• Fragile and post-conflict countries implement sound ESP’s 
• All girls complete primary school and in enroll in secondary school 
• The number of students mastering grade 3 literacy and numeracy skills increases 
• Improved teacher effectiveness 
• Increased volume in financing  
At the time of implementation, the project was assessed to benefit over 6,000 primary schools 
and 900,000 students with 50% of those being female (World Bank 2014). This is done through 
three different learning goals as outline below. 
Improving the learning environment and opportunities in targeted areas 
This goal was targeted through performance-based school grants, programs to increase 
school readiness and strengthening reading outcomes. Performance-based school grants are 
projected to increase access to additional resources, increase the learning environment and 
increase training for school officials. Schools must meet agreed-upon requirements and markers 
to continue receiving funding, to implement a reward-based system for schools that foster quality 
education. Schools are ‘judged’ by the number of days open, the amount of students in classes 
and amount of classes as well as quality indicator monitoring (World Bank 2014). School 
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readiness is improved through an individual project providing 50 pre-primary classrooms, 
teacher training as well as available teacher resources. Reading outcomes are strengthened 
through providing books for students as well as teachers, a national reading campaign and 
training for teachers.  
Strengthening education service delivery   
This goal is designed to improve the measurement of education outcomes, establishing a 
new data collection system and a sounds system of providing education. The project provides 
technical coordination to analyze education assessments. This will then aid in establishing a new 
data collection system. This data collection system is built on the student census that has been 
carried out by the ministry with the help of the World Bank. The goal of this data collection 
system is to increase the autonomy of the Sierra Leonean government in assessing education in 
their country. The project also supports improving the successful delivery of education, mostly 
by aiding the Nigerian government in providing and establishing assessments, improve staff 
capacity and the development of budgets. 
Project Success 
The direct success of the project 
The project was originally met with difficulties due to the Ebola outbreak, which 
prompted many schools to close. The project has met several criteria and has overall increased 
school performance, teachers’ skills and implemented. Overall the project had 2.3 million 
beneficiaries, reopened 8,100 schools, and 44 percent of schools have met 60 percent of 
performance targets (World Bank 2017). In addition, 50 pre-primary classrooms have been built, 
1,350 schools are still receiving performance-based school grants, 5,970 schools have been 
disinfected and have received handwashing stations post-Ebola outbreak, 36,000 handwashing 
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stations have been distributed to schools. Perhaps most importantly, however, all 14 districts of 
Sierra Leone benefitted from the project. The success of the project can be summarized by the 
following markers: 




meet at least 
60% of 
performance  
0 60 % 85% 
% of trained 
teachers using 
new methods 












0 50% 50% 
Table 10: Project Baselines and Results, Source: World Bank 2017 
Aid project impact on post-conflict reconciliation 
While not reaching all of the target goals, this project was able to increase the quality and 
accessibility of education. The project is important to consider for post-conflict reconciliation as 
it increases and rebuilds the institution of education. After a civil war, the main challenge for a 
state is the damage done to institutions. Therefore, strengthening these institutions can have a 
positive impact on the country. Education is especially important as it prepares the future of the 
country and therefore directly impacts the path the country can take. While socioeconomic and 
regional disparities continue to influence the quality of education in Sierra Leone, this project is 
a good step in the right direction to rebuilding this institution. The improvement of education is 
mostly able to address a weakened civil society with high unemployment and former child 
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soldiers needing a new place in society (Kaldor and Vincent 2006). An important factor and the 
end goal of post-conflict reconciliation is curbing the emergence of political violence. 
Addressing high unemployment and former child soldiers is therefore crucial to curb grievances 
and relative deprivation that may arise in the future. This project is instrumental in rebuilding 
institutions especially for former child soldiers and the unemployment, recognizing that most 
unemployed in Sierra Leone are former child soldiers. 
Possible Shortcomings 
The project faced difficulties with the Ebola outbreak, causing the delay of the project by 
one year. The project made up for this by increasing the disbursement amounts. In addition, 
some data such as the number of teachers trained, and policy guidelines developed have not been 
assessed yet as the project received additional funding in 2017, moving the closing date of the 
project to 2018.  
Another factor is the wide criticism of the Global Partnership on Education project. Just 
like in the Global Partnership on Education project in Nigeria, possible shortcomings are 
addressed by Menashy (2017).  The author finds that GPE projects often fail to address private 
schooling in receiving countries, which is mostly due to the number of political entities in a 
multistakeholder project (Menashy 2017, 240). These political bodies then choose to 
“strategically avoid” the topic of private education, to avoid institutional clashing. This further 
applies to other policies that may cause clashing or disagreement, with private education 
highlighting the issue (Menashy 2017, 261). This is an important factor to keep in mind which 
may render the projects by the GPE less successful, in terms of achieving their goals. 
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Summary 
The project can be considered successful in curbing political violence and aiding in post-
conflict reconciliation. While the project had some difficulties with starting due to the Ebola 
outbreak, it was still able to attain most of their targets and benefited all districts in Sierra Leone 
(World Bank 2017). While the general structure of GPE projects has received criticism due to its 
multistakeholder nature, this project was able to address problems in education in Sierra Leone. 
This aid is also important in cases of public sectors such as education, as the government is still 
working to rebuild this with limited funds. Lastly, the rebuilding and commitment to education in 
Sierra Leone is the right direction in rebuilding institutions and making resources available for 
former child soldiers and to combat unemployment. While we cannot say for certain that this will 
curb violence in the end, it is more likely to as grievances are often motivators for violence. 
Foreign aid is crucial in these case studies as it enables these projects to have an impact in areas 
in the country that may not be the priority for the nation or that the nation is unable to fund. 
Conclusion 
This research aimed to understand the relationship between foreign aid and political 
violence. Throughout the paper, I explored the theory of aid and aid projects being able to 
alleviate some grievances that in turn cause political violence. In addition, I focused on post-
conflict reconciliation projects and how they can curb future cases of political violence. For the 
research, I conducted both quantitative and qualitative analyses. The quantitative analysis further 
explored my theory utilizing two different datasets. One dataset included data on the number of 
attacks country-wide and regionally, foreign aid and projects in Nigeria. The other dataset also 
looked at a number of attacks country-wide and regionally, foreign aid and projects in Sierra 
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Leone. The qualitative analysis studied four different aid projects in Sierra Leone and Nigeria, 
focusing on poverty reduction, education, and DDR. 
Summary and Discussion of the Qualitative Analysis 
The qualitative analysis looked at individual projects being able to improve grievances in 
the individual country and turn either improving recruitment of terror cells or post-conflict 
reconciliation. For the case of Nigeria, two projects were studied. One was a project on education 
focused on connecting the Nigerian government and the Global Partnership for Education. This 
project aimed to increase school enrollment, reading levels and equal education for both genders. 
However, the project was mostly unsuccessful in achieving its pre-set goals, but should not be 
completely disregarded. While the project was not able to reach its goals, it still focused 
resources into Nigerian schools and established a partnership between the Nigerian government 
and other world organizations to improve education. The project most likely had little influence 
on recruitment for a terror organization as the project did not focus enough on Qur’anic schools, 
a breeding ground for Boko Haram recruits.  
The other project in Nigeria focused on poverty reduction and was implemented by the 
World Bank. The project was able to implement social programs, possibly helping to curb terror 
cell recruitment. The project was able to improve access of the poor to social and economic 
infrastructure with 2999 micro projects. While the project is a good start to curb the recruitment 
of Boko Haram, more needs to be done to strengthen the government of Nigeria. Terror 
organizations involved in providing public services continues being a problem and garners them 
support and recruits.  
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In the case of Sierra Leone, this research studied two different projects with the goal of 
post-conflict reconciliation. The first project focused on DDR and retraining former soldiers of 
the Sierra Leonean civil war. This aid project has been able to make considerable strides in terms 
of reintegrating and training former soldiers in an effort to rebuild communities and the country. 
Specifically, the DDR project was able to lead former soldiers into employment or establishing 
their own business. This project is also important to post-conflict reconciliation and curbing 
future political violence by decreasing the possibility of grievances. Reintegrating and training 
former soldiers decreases the opportunity for this group to become marginalized and experience 
grievances. However, the project could have done more to include women and former female 
soldiers. Women continue to hold a difficult place in Sierra Leonean society, with little rights 
and lack of enforcement mechanisms for attained rights.  
The second project focused on education in Sierra Leone. This project was also 
implemented by the Global Partnership for Education. While the project had some difficulties 
with starting due to the Ebola outbreak, it was still able to attain most of their targets and 
benefited all districts in Sierra Leone. The project was able to rebuild education in some 
communities which are an important factor for post-conflict reconciliation. The commitment to 
education in Sierra Leone is the right direction in rebuilding institutions and making resources 
available for former child soldiers and to combat unemployment. 
Summary and Discussion of the Quantitative Analysis 
The quantitative analysis aimed to research the relationship of foreign aid on political 
violence in a quantitative matter. The quantitative analysis focused on Sierra Leone shows the 
increases of violent events coinciding with the intervention of ECOMOG and President Kabbah 
taking back the presidency after the previous coup, removing him from power (Gberie 2005, 
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111). In 1999 events decreased drastically, most likely due to the Lomé peace deal. The Lomé 
peace deal was able to reach consensus between the Sierra Leonean government and the RUF, 
allowing DDR programs to take into effect. From then on violent events decreased through 2002, 
when the civil war officially ended.  
Further, aid in Sierra Leone increased after the civil war was over, suggesting aid given 
to assist in post-conflict reconciliation. The increase of aid after the war and violent events after 
military interventions match with expectations for this project. This also shows that it is 
worthwhile studying post-conflict reconciliation as countries give more aid.  
For the study of Nigeria, the emergence of violent events coincides with the emergence 
of Boko Haram and its violent spurs throughout the years. The analysis also shows clusters of 
many events specifically in the North and Northeast of Nigeria. These states are Borno in the 
very north, Yobe state to the left of Borno, Adamawa state underneath Borno and Plateau state. 
Borno is perhaps the most important state as Boko Haram first emerged from there. In terms of 
aid, transactions increased specifically around 2009, when Boko Haram’s activity increased and 
became more violent. However, transactions then fluctuated throughout the years, although Boko 
Haram increased their violent events with events such as the Chibok schoolgirls kidnapping in 
2014. This is interesting to see as the expected outcome would be seeing aid increase as events 
increase. 
Comparison to Expectations and Limitations in this Study 
Expectations for this study reflect the two hypotheses, one being that foreign aid has a 
positive impact on political violence and the other being that foreign aid has a negative impact on 
violence. The analysis of Sierra Leone confirmed that countries give aid after a conflict or civil 
 82  
 
war to further post-conflict reconciliation, confirming one of the expectations, that foreign aid 
has a positive impact on violence. The case of Sierra Leone showed that the amount of aid and 
projects increased after the war ended making a case for post-conflict reconciliation. The 
quantitative analysis of Nigeria, however, showed that aid transactions and projects decreased 
after the number of violent events increased, which did not match either narrative. Rather, this 
scenario confirmed the null hypothesis of the first hypothesis stating that foreign aid does have 
an impact on political violence. These further highlight two issues, one being the difficulty of the 
project and assessing aid. This project does not address why countries give aid, as this is not in 
the scope of this thesis and would require more research. 
In the qualitative analysis, the expectations were similar. I expected to see aid projects 
targeting grievances such as poverty and education or reintegrating former soldiers. The projects 
in Sierra Leone were able to retrain and reintegrate former soldiers into the country, while the 
projects in Nigeria had some success with providing education and poverty alleviation. These aid 
projects did target grievances; however, it is difficult to assess their true impact on violence. For 
one, this project does not assess the long-term effects of DDR efforts and post-conflict 
reconciliation on grievances and curbing violence. Similarly, the impact of lowering poverty and 
improving education cannot be assessed in the long-term either.  
Implications of this Project 
This project summarizes the effects of foreign aid on political violence. While this project 
only studied two cases, the implications can be applied widely. This project shows that aid an 
important foreign policy tool and proves its effectiveness to policymakers. Firstly, this project 
displays that aid can have an impact on political violence, especially in terms of post-conflict 
reconciliation. This means policymakers in another country or of a non-governmental 
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organization can continue giving aid and implementing aid projects in stats that have just 
suffered a conflict.  
This study also proves that aid projects can be used to reduce grievances that can lead to 
violence, potentially curbing violence and recruitment in the end. This is applicable globally and 
not just to the two case studies as political violence has the same common motivators, as laid out 
at the beginning of this paper and explained by Gurr. For policymakers this means that giving aid 
with the goal of reducing or curbing violence can be succesful. However, the case study of 
Nigeria shows that these aid giving countries need proper research of the country that is 
supposed to receive aid and instiutionts in place. This is important to make sure grievances are 
really addressed in order to have an impact on violence.  
While this project only studied two cases the findings can be applied more broadly. This 
project can be applied to any nation that suffers from political violence and receives foreign aid. 
This raises the question why nations that experience political violence and foreign aid do not 
become more peaceful. This thesis would suggest that this would be due to aid funneled into the 
country without targeting the correct areas, leaving grievances to increase. This again goes to 
show how important proper research is on behalf of the giving country or organization. However, 
donors may also experience limitations of where aid can go or may be unwilling to send aid to 
already fragile areas. 
Further implications of this research are that aid projects can have a significant impact on 
post-conflict reconciliation and help in rebuilding the country. This in turn then reduces 
grievances, again curbing potential future violence. This can also be applied globally, as most 
countries experience the same common problems after a conflict or war, mostly due to broken 
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institutions. Therefore, this project can be applied broadly in the study of foreign aid on political 
violence.  
Further research 
As laid out in the sections on limitations to this project, this project is not able to study 
the short-term and long-term effects of aid and aid projects on violence. This project merely 
spells out the impact aid can have on grievances, studying specific aid project and traces the 
impact aid has had on violence. Current limitations include the lack of research on aid allocation 
Therefore, a long-term study of violence and aid could show us how past projects have 
influenced violence. This is something that could be explored with more time and could give 
some clarity to the causal effects of the study. 
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Appendix 
Nigeria’s History and Violent Extremism 
To understand political violence in Nigeria today, one must look at Nigeria’s history and 
violent extremism in the past. When studying violent extremism in Nigeria, it is important to 
consider ethnic tensions and political context as well as religion (Comolli 2015, 11). Up until the 
nineteenth century, northern Nigeria used to be dominated by city-states and kingdoms largely 
composed of Hausa elite. Hausa is an ethnic group in Nigeria. However, wars were the norm as 
kings constantly tried to increase their empire. The rulers of the Hausaland converted to Islam 
predating Christianity in Nigeria (Comolli 2015, 12). Usman Dan Fodio is considered to be the 
founder of Islam in Nigeria and helped spread Islam across the northern region of Nigeria by 
declaring jihad against infidels in 1804. Today, he still an important figure in Nigeria and serves 
as inspiration for many groups. For instance, Boko Haram declared in a letter in 2011 that they 
strive to bring back the memory and legacy of Dan Fodio (Comolli 2015, 13-14). Dan Fodio 
belonged to the Fulani that eventually moved to Hausaland; he then became a widely respected 
figure in his ethnic group alongside his group, the Qadiriyya Brotherhood. He gained trust and 
support in the states Katsina, Kebbi, and Zamfara. The government of Nigeria and extremist 
groups then first came in contact when the King Yunfa took the Gobir throne in 1801 and 
decided to persecute and exile the Fulani. Gobir is the former name of Nigeria, as it was still 
evolving and found to be a city-state (Comolli 2015, 13). Dan Fodio and his followers moved to 
Gudu and began an opposition. Later on, Dan Fodio was elected Amir al-Mumiriin which led to 
political power (Comolli 2015, 14). Eventually, this led to King Yunfa and Dan Fodio beginning 
a feud with Fodio starting a guerrilla warfare. 
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Dan Fodio and the Fulani people then began attacking the Hausa, fed up with oppression, 
high taxes and violations of Sharia law such as the permission of alcohol. In 1809 Hausa kings 
were ousted, and Fodio became the first Sultan of Sokoto Caliphate in Gobir (Comolli 2015, 15). 
Today the caliph of Sokoto remains a popular and leading figure, one whose support is sought by 
the Nigerian government. Dan Fodio then extended his jihad covering areas under control as far 
as Bauchi, Nupe, and Yoruba. Today the Hausa and Fulani are known as the Hausa-Fulani as 
they joined forces when they both shared a common religion. They make up 30% of Nigeria’s 
population, and Hausa is the most common spoken language (Comolli 2015, 16). When the 
British colonized Nigeria, decided to leave the Fulani alone, as they were scared of resistance. 
This allowed them to expand their empire (Comolli 2015, 16-17). After the colonial rule was 
over in 1960 most positions in the government were given to the Igbos. Then, in 1966 an 
attempted coup d’etat resulted in the killing of two prominent northern leaders, which resulted in 
an Igbo, Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi becoming president. Northern soldiers then launched a counter-
coup, and Igbo’s living in the North became isolated. In 1967, Ojukwu, the governor of the 
southeast declared the Republic of Biafra, a newly independent country. A war erupted, between 
the Nigerian government with the help of British forces against weakened Biafran people. The 
war also impoverished many and led to a famine that led to 2 million Biafrans dying (Comolli 
2015, 16-18).  
Religious and ethnic tensions have continued since Nigeria’s independence in October 
1960. Wole Soyinka, a Nigerian Nobel Peace Laureate has said, "I consider myself a Yoruba 
before I'm a Nigerian. That is my immediate instant identity. And I think most intellectuals will 
say the same thing, and politicians. However, here we are together, brought together by the 
British. They are operating the same constitution. A new identity which supervenes the various 
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ethnic nationalities is born” (al-Jazeera 2010). Despite Soyinka’s optimism, rival ethnic, regional 
and religious identities have contributed to violence and instability, as Nigeria alternated 
between democracy and military rule since independence (al-Jazeera 2010). Regional, religious 
and ethnic leaders competed for control of the state and the power and resources that came with 
it, as when efforts by Igbo leaders in the oil-rich southeastern region of Nigeria to secede sparked 
a bloody civil war in 1967 (al-Jazeera 2010). The mixture of poor job prospects as well as 
poverty with ethnic disparities and exclusions have shown to heavily correlate with successful 
recruitment and individual motivation in Africa (UNDP 2017, 55). Today, scholars argue that the 
people living in the North in Nigeria may fall back onto sharia law and education as they view 
the state as a failure as well as its education system (Comolli 2015, 18-19). 
Background on Boko Haram or Jama’atu Ahlis Sunnah Lidda’awati w’al Jihad 
Beginnings in Borno state under Lawan and Yusuf 
Boko Haram’s origin can be traced back to 1995 at the University of Maiduguri, Borno 
state, where a Muslim leader, Lawan, set up a Muslim youth organization. This organization was 
built around a conservative non-violent movement. However, in 2002, Lawan left, and 
Mohammed Yusuf was appointed the leader of the sect (Comolli 2015, 45-47). The first oust of 
violence then emerged in 2003 when public buildings and police stations were attacked in Yobe. 
It is unclear what lead to this, but the existing political sphere could have contributed including 
the re-election of Christian President Obasanjo in 2003 (Comolli 2015, 50). The widely accepted 
origin of Boko Haram is said to be that the youth was fed up with corruption around them which 
prompted them to move to Yobe and set up a base there, named “Afghanistan.” New members 
arrived from other countries, such as Niger, Cameroon, and Chad. After increased military 
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strikes against Boko Haram in Yobe, they returned to Borno. Boko Haram then began to expand 
their reach into Bauchi, Yobe, and Niger after returning to Borno (Comolli 2015, 50-51).  
Eventually Boko Haram gained power through Boko Haram members being sitting 
members of city councils,  setting up a “state within a state” with police and cabinet. Yusuf also 
set up a mosque for the youth, named after known Salafist Taymiyyah. Salafism is a form of 
Sunni Islam, characterized by the notion that Islam should be rid of non-Muslim influences. The 
name Boko Haram can be translated to “Western education is forbidden”  in Hausa. However, 
this name was popularized by the media, members of Boko Haram call the sect Jama’atu Ahlis 
Sunnah Lidda’awati w’al Jihad (Comolli 2015, 51). In 2009, Boko Haram declared that they do 
not reject Western education per se but Western civilization. This means that Western culture is 
rejected and Islamic ways of life reinforced. From 2004 to 2008 Boko Haram stayed mostly 
dormant with the exception of a major initiative in 2007. This period shaped Boko Haram, with 
reports of training under al-Qaeda officials in Afghanistan and Pakistan as well as receiving 
funds from al-Qaeda to target Americans in Nigeria (Comolli 2015, 51). Yusuf continued his 
teachings, amassing an impressive following. This following grew, as he created a system of 
informal social welfare, setting up microfinancing systems (Comolli 2015, 52).  
A shift in leadership 
Then in 2009, Boko Haram re-emerged, and their tactics changed soon after. In 2009, 
tensions were heightened due to a confrontation between Boko Haram members and officers 
belonging to Operation Flush. This operation was tasked with robberies and enforcing the 
wearing of helmets. On June 11, 2009, Boko Haram members were traveling to a funeral when 
the officer stopped the procession asking them to put on helmets. After refusing, violence broke 
out between the officers and sect member (Comolli 2015, 53). Boko Haram then declared the 
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state as their enemy, and the state began to crack down on Boko Haram. Many members were 
arrested, firearms and explosives were seized. Boko Haram then retaliated and attacked a police 
station in Bauchi in which 50 people died. The police then attacked the base near the Bauchi 
airstrip. Violence then spread to Borno, Kano, Katsina, and Yobe with more than 100 causalities 
in one day (Comolli 2015, 53-55).  
The government then deployed the army to crack down on Boko Haram. Many locals 
were displaced, and Yusuf, as well as his then deputy Shekau, were arrested. Yusuf then died in 
custody of the government; however the circumstances are debated. The police claim that he 
tried to escape and was killed during this, while others say that he died during police questioning 
(Comolli 2015, 58-60). Witnesses report that Yusuf and other Boko Haram members were shot 
as the police lacked confidence in the judicial system of Nigeria. The, between August 2009 and 
April 2010, the group was believed extinct. In 2010 Abubakar Shekau took over, starting a new, 
more violent period of Boko Haram (Comolli 2015, 63). Boko Haram then widened their targets 
and began attacking institutions associated with democracy such as polling places but also 
schools, bars, hospitals, mosques, and prisons. After 2012, the group Jama’atu Ansaril 
Muslimina fi Biladis Sudan criticized Boko Haram for the killing of Muslims, stating that the 
Qur’an forbids the killing of innocent people. The group then declared that they would be ready 
to fight any group that targeted Muslims. Eventually, many groups splintered off from Boko 
Haram, continuing to operate in Nigeria and neighboring countries such as Cameroon and Chad 
(Comolli 2015, 63-70). 
Sierra Leone’s History and the Diamond Trade 
Sierra Leone is a small West African state that began as a settlement for freed slaves sent 
by the British government. The small area was called Freetown, however quickly experienced 
 101  
 
conflict, disease and food shortage forcing the freed Blacks to work for slave traders. This fueled 
abolitionists and caused Freetown to become Britain’s first colony. Britain then infused the 
country with freed Blacks from Jamaica and North America. Eventually the mix of early settlers 
and freed Blacks came to be known as Creole. The rest of Sierra Leone as we know it today 
became a British protectorate along with Freetown. The constitution of 1924 brought all of Sierra 
Leone together as a political unit with unicameral legislature with the colony and protectorate 
represented in the same chamber. The protectorate was allocated more seats which heightened 
tensions; this struggle saw the emergence of two political parties, the National Council of Sierra 
Leone for the colony and the Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP) for the protectorate. The SLPP 
eventually gained majority control with the backing of protectorate educated people, forcing the 
colonial authorities to introduce the constitution of 1951. This constitution gave the protectorate 
majority control, making SLPP leader Milton Margai prime minister.  
The country then became independent under Margai in 1961. The years directly before 
and after independence were marked by violence. Before independence the oppressiveness of 
chiefs in the Northern province led to riots and protests, other protests were directed at the 
corrupt government, directly targeting future prime ministers Albert Margai and Siaka Stevens. 
In both instances, the army responded resulting in deaths. The development of diamonds as a 
natural resource in Sierra Leone also changed the political landscape. Commercial exploitation 
first started in 1931 by British companies. Diamonds soon came to dominate Sierra Leone’s 
economy. Siaka Stevens became prime minister in 1967, however before he was a minister of 
mines in the Margai regime. Through this position, Stevens was able to grant government status 
to all mines. After Milton Margai’s death, his younger brother Albert Margai became prime 
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minister of Sierra Leone, much to the disliking of other ethnic groups and Stevens. In 1967 
Stevens won the election.  
However, a coup led by David Lansana took over the government. A day after the coup, 
he was unseated by the National Reformation Council (NRC) which was in turn unseated by 
junior soldiers who returned the government to Stevens. In 1968. Lansana was later charged with 
treason and executed. Stevens was then able to reduce the opposition in parliament through 
declaring a state of emergencies, arresting the opposition and fraudulent election petitions. In 
1977, Stevens became prime minister again, after heavily fraudulent elections. In 1978, Stevens 
had a bill declaring Sierra Leone a one-party state passed. In fear of the army, Stevens starved 
the army of its resources and created his army the Internal Security Division, which later came to 
be a tool to intimidate political opponents. Heads of all-important institutions in Sierra Leone 
were political appointees backing Stevens. Stevens soon became greedy and involved in illegal 
diamond mining with the Lebanese community in Sierra Leone. He later nationalized the 
diamond trade, with a 12% share just for himself. The government neglected much of rural 
Sierra Leone, causing a high infant mortality rate, malaria, and undernourished children. In 1985, 
Stevens handed Sierra Leone over to his successor, Joseph Momoh. Momoh’s regime was 
comprised of the same people as Stevens’ regime. However, in 1987 Momoh arrest most of them 
under coup suspicions. In the 1990s resistance against the Momoh state and one-party state 
gained momentum.  
Background on the Revolutionary United Front 
Beginnings of Foday Sankoh 
The beginnings of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) start with Foday Sankoh, a 
soldier in the Sierra Leonean army. During the 20th century, the army was widely unpopular, 
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mainly due to its ties with colonial oppression. The army was used to ensure compliance in 
Sierra Leone. Sankoh was in the army when Lansana staged the coup against Stevens but did not 
play any role in it. Sankoh has however claimed to have been part of the junior soldier group 
who unseated the NRC and returned the regime to Stevens. In 1971, another coup of the Stevens 
regime was attempted, this time supported by Sankoh. Sankoh was later arrested for failing to 
report the planning of the coup (Gberie 2005, 42). 
 Exactly twenty years after the failed second coup, on March 23, 1991, Sankoh 
announced the launch of a people’s armed struggle to overthrow the oppressive Momoh regime. 
This came after Sankoh had moved to Bo, the most important center of dissidents in Sierra 
Leone. There Sankoh became involved with the Pan African Union, which had been started by 
university lecturers of the Fourah Bay College. These lecturers had partaken in protests against 
the Stevens regime in 1977, which led to violence and eventually another rigged re-election of 
Stevens. While this group did not constitute the emergence of the RUF, some of its members 
later joined the RUF. An important turn in the story of the RUF happened with the Sierra 
Leonean government boycotting Gaddafi’s hosting of the annual Organization of African Union 
meeting. In response, Gaddafi channeled funds to regime critical university students. A Green 
Book Study Group was started propagandising Gaddafi’s political ideas, and soon after 
demonstrations were started at the Fourah Bay College. The group then recruited more people 
including Sankoh and received training in Libya. However, the group soon died down. The only 
members that would not give up were Sankoh, Abu Kanu, and Rashid Mansaray. While the trio’s 
attempts died down as well. Sankoh was invited by Gaddafi to train in his Benghazi camp. In this 
camp, Gaddafi trained government dissidents from all the countries he did not politically agree 
with. In this camp, Sankoh met Charles Taylor. Charles Taylor needed a base to forge his war in 
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Liberia. After being turned down and arrested by the Momoh regime, Taylor came to Sankoh. 
Sankoh, Abu Kanu, and Mansaray then joined Taylor in Burkina Faso and in the attempt to 
overthrow the Liberian government.  
The RUF and the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) 
With the war in Liberia taking on ethnic dimensions, ethnic groups either rallied behind 
the NPFL or the original Doe regime (Gberie 2005, 56). Many died through the war mostly 
targeted due to their ethnicity. The Doe regime was on the verge of collapse with NPFL forces 
capturing the capital, Monrovia. By the same time, tough, the NPFL had split with a new group 
emerging. This new group was led by Prince Johnson and called the Independent National 
Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL). This war caused a massive exodus of people into countries 
such as Sierra Leone. At the same time ECOWAS, the Economic Community of West African 
States put together an intervention group, ECOMOG. President Doe and some of his military had 
barricaded themselves in the presidential palace, fighting Taylor’s forces on the one hand and 
Johnson’s on the other. Johnson then captured Doe in front of ECOMOG troops, torturing and 
killing him. As a result, Charles Taylor felt cheated of capturing Doe and vowed to attack 
Freetown’s international airport in response (Gberie 2005, 58). In 1991, Sankoh announced that 
President Momoh should resign or face an armed rebellion. The RUF war began on 23 March 
1991, when rebels attacked two border towns in Sierra Leone. The government of Sierra Leone 
quickly blamed the attacks on Charles Taylor, ignoring Sankoh. However, Sankoh made sure he 
would not be ignored, capturing towns in the Kailahun district (Gberie 2005, 60).  
The Sierra Leonean Civil War 
At first, the Sierra Leonean army only arrived later, after the RUF had already attacked 
towns. However, after Guinea and Nigeria supported Sierra Leone with troops, the army went on 
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the offensive towards the end of 1991. While the forces were still widely effective, they quickly 
gained more support with the United Liberation Movement of Liberia (Ulimo). Ulimo was 
created in Sierra Leone by former soldiers of the Doe army. They launched an offensive against 
the RUF, successfully taking back Pujehun district and pushing the RUF back into Liberia 
(Gberie 2005, 64).  While Ulimo fought in Liberia “at the doorstep of Taylor,” Guinean and 
Sierra Leonean forces were fighting a stalemate in Sierra Leone. This stalemate caused Momoh 
to changes his political stance, signing a multiparty constitution. Corruption of funds eventually 
caused front-line soldiers to go without pay, prompting a coup led by Solomon Musa. They 
formed a junta called the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) with Valentine Strasser 
as the new leader (Gberie 2005, 68).  
The NPRC promised to end the war quickly and stopped all programs artificially creating 
product scarcity, which made them popular fast. The newly formed government then comprised 
new volunteer forces, largely made up of youths that had lost their families at the hands of the 
RUF. By 1993, over 1,000 young boys mostly under age fifteen were enlisted in the army. After 
human rights organizations denounced this, the NPRC announced that these groups were to be 
demobilized (Gberie 2005, 77). In 1992, the RUF captured the biggest mining town in the 
country, Gandorhun. After the army recaptured the town, they began punishing anyone helping 
the RUF. This led to imprisonment, torture, and killings at the hands of the Sierra Leonean army. 
The regime further murdered twenty citizens, including a pregnant woman in 1992 due to 
allegations of plotting a coup. By the end of 1993, the Sierra Leonean government had 
recaptured major land, causing Strasser to announce a ceasefire and calling for remaining rebels 
to surrender.  
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However, only a month later the war escalated. Many soldiers had either left their posts 
watching a major soccer game or had felt betrayed by the NPRC, joining the RUF. This coined 
the term of sobels, soldiers by day and rebels by night. Disloyalty to the military further 
deteriorated the war and caused major problems. The corrupt NPRC army dismantled and killed 
many volunteer soldiers that fought the RUF, including the Kamajoisia (Gberie 2005, 84). 
However, Deputy Minister of Defence, Hinga Norman was able to keep the Kamajoisia alive and 
give them a more important role in the military. In 1996, the Kamajoisia were able to capture 
Zogoda, the RUF’s last remaining stronghold at the time. Military members, as well as RUF 
members, also engaged in terrorist attacks throughout the country. In 1996 Strasser was also 
overthrown. Eventually, Ahmad Kabbah of the Sierra Leone People’s Party comes to power in 
1996 after his victory in the presidential election. While Kabbah was quickly removed from 
power by his military, ECOMOG led by Nigeria reinstated order and Kabbah resumed power in 
1998 (Gberie 2005, 111).   
ECOMOG quickly became the governments only defense, with the Sierra Leonean army 
largely dismantling and partly joining the RUF.  While ECOMOG was able to overtake 
Freetown on behalf of the government, more rural areas were harder to overtake. In 1999 Nigeria 
was bound to recall their ECOMOG forces which caused diplomatic missions to intervene, 
coming to the Lomé peace accord (Abdullah 2004). The Lomé peace accord was signed in July 
of 1999 and pardoned Sankoh for treason, gave him a transitional position in the government as a 
form of Vice President as well as a position overseeing the mining fields. The peace accord was 
also conditional on the RUF dismantling arms (Abdullah 2004, 138). After the signing of the 
peace accord, many rebels refused to give up arms. As a result, Disarmament, Demobilization, 
and Reintegration (DDR) camps were set up allowing rebels to exchange weapons for food, 
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shelter, and training in new skills (Gberie 2005, 163). The camps proved much more successful 
and effective post-2000.  
Alongside the Lomé peace accord and DDR camps, the United Nations sent 
peacekeeping forces. The United Nations Mission to Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was there to 
assist the peace accord and brought a serious amount of troops (Woods and Reese 2008). 
However, the troops brought controversy with them as well, with the head of the UNAMISL 
troop accusing Nigerian army forces of illegal mining. While UNAMSIL troops were deployed 
in Sierra Leone, Russian forces also helped out with troops and helicopters, and the British army 
intervened as well. In 2000, the British forces helped UNAMSIL from the brink of collapse and 
re-established order. This was an important break at the end of the civil war, as they stabilized 
the situation, took back the main parts of Sierra Leone and triggered an additional ceasefire 
(Gberie 2005, 176). Further, Guinean troops helped push back RUF troops, and a UN resolution 
demanded the Liberian government to stop working with the RUF (Gberie 2005, 177). On 
January 18, 2002, President Kabbah declared the war officially over.  
